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Is the word mightier than the sword? In most conflicts, adversaries aim for victory by both 
direct force and indirectly, by undermining the enemy's will to resist. Rapid, easy victories 
often rely as much on military might as on destroying the enemy’s morale (Hastings 2011; 
Horne 2012). Two tools are often used in a bid to weaken the enemy's will: "shock and awe" - 
impressive shows of strength - and propaganda. Air power advocates have long argued that 
bombing can weaken support for a regime, undermining the enemy’s morale while boosting 
internal disssent (Douhet 1921). Some argue that the atomic bombing of Japan hastened the 
end of the war (Hastings 2011).1 Similarly, propaganda is often used by foreign powers 
during wartime to undermine morale and promote resistance (Somerville 2012). 
There is widespread skepticism about the efficacy of both aerial attack and foreign 
propaganda: US bombing in Vietnam boosted Communist insurgents' popularity (Dell and 
Querubin 2018); the "Blitz" – Germany's bombing of London in 1940 – may have increased 
support for the UK government (Hastings 2013, 458). Because German armament production 
and civilian morale did not collapse, the Allied bomber offensive during World War II against 
Germany is widely considered a failure (Overy 2013; Pape 1996). 2 . Similarly, (Pütter 1997) 
suggests that allied radio programs did little to win German hearts and minds. Generally, there 
is substantial skepticism about the effectiveness of foreign media campaigns because people 
will not trust “the enemy” (Martinez-Bravo 2019; Manheim 1986; Pieslak 2009).  
In this paper, we examine the effects of bombing and radio propaganda on domestic 
opposition and morale during World War II. We do so for the Allied air offensive against 
Germany in World War II—the second-largest bombing campaign in history.3 Between 1939 
and 1945, British and American bombers dropped more than two million tons of TNT4 in 
Europe alone, the equivalent of more than 100 of the nuclear bombs that destroyed Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. The air war was costly for all combatants: The UK devoted one third of 
                                                
1 The claim is disputed by some other scholars (Wilson 2007). 
2 John K. Galbraith called it "... the greatest miscalculation of the war." Galbraith acted as one of the civilian 
directors of the US Strategic Bombing Survey, tasked with evaluating the effects of the air war. One leading 
historian, Richard Overy (2013) went as far as to argue that, “the effect of bombing was not, as the Allies hoped, 
to drive a wedge between people and regime, but the opposite…”  
3 The bombing of Vietnam involved higher tonnages dropped, but fewer aircrafts. 
4 The explosive power of different explosives is, by convention, measured in tons of TNT (specifically, 2,4,6-
trinitrotoluene)—a unit of energy that equals 4.184 gigajoules. 
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wartime production to strategic bombing.5 Allied air attacks killed 360,000 Germans alone. 
Casualties among Allied aircrews outnumbered the number of service men killed in ground 
combat on the Western front: of the Royal Air Force (RAF) bomber crews 56,000 men died; 
the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) lost 20,000 men (Hastings 2013). We examine 
the impact of bombing and radio propaganda on two groups of Germans: those potentially 
critical of the regime, and those potentially favoring the regime, i.e. highly motivated military 
personnel. First, we show that bombing can increase the frequency of active resistance 
substantially—even against an overwhelmingly powerful, efficiently run, and deeply 
entrenched government (Evans 2008). Second, we demonstrate that bombing of the Reich had 
a pronounced, negative impact on the morale of German fighter pilots.  
We begin by compiling new data on resistance against the Nazi regime in Germany during 
World War II. Information from treason trials provides details on the scale and seriousness of 
resistance activity.6 We focus on the years 1943–44—the period when the overwhelming 
share of bombing occurred, but before Germany’s final defeat was certain. This is also the 
period when the People’s Court, a high-level court staffed by determined Nazi judges, had 
exclusive jurisdiction over treason trials. Treasonable activity ranged from defeatist 
comments, distributing leaflets, and encouraging sabotage by foreign slave workers to the 
attempted assassination of Hitler and the overthrow of his government, including the famous 
von Stauffenberg plot of military officers in the summer of 1944.  
For most of the war, Allied bombers flew from UK bases. German cities beyond the 
operational range of these planes were bombed much less—and they also saw fewer acts of  
resistance. Bombers’ limited operational range created a sharp discontinuity in bombing and 
resistance. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we first show that the drop in bombing 
beyond the range of the main bomber used by the Allies neatly coincides with a decline in 
resistance activity. Next, we analyze changes in the frequency of bombing and resistance 
activity over time, exploiting the panel nature of our data. Volatile weather conditions serve 
as an exogenous source of variation. We predict daily bombing from daily data on winds 
speeds over German cities during World War II. A doubling of bomb volume increased the 
number of resistance cases in our data by 4.8%, and the probability of resistance grew by 
3.8%. Importantly, our results are not driven by a rise in policing after bombing raids.  
                                                
5 O’Brien (2015) shows that half of German armament and munitions output was devoted to aircraft and anti-
aircraft guns.  
6 These data were first exploited in a quantitative fashion by Geerling, Magee, and Brooks (2013).   
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Allied bombing not only targeted civilians; it also aimed to undermine the German armed 
forces’ will to resist. To study this channel, we analyze the performance of German fighter 
pilots during World War II. In aerial combat, individual motivation is key—asymmetric 
information abounds, and there is no effective control by superiors during an air battle (Ager 
et al. 2017). For 352 German pilots who scored more than 5 victories (‘aces’ who are in the 
top 7% of pilots), we collect data on their city of origin.7 Combining this information with the 
time of bombing and data on the number of aerial victories, we test whether aerial attack on 
pilots’ hometowns undermined their combat effectiveness. We find sharp reductions in the 
frequency of monthly aerial victories: while pilots downed on average 1.9 Allied aircrafts per 
month, this rate declined by 10-30% after home-town bombings.  
Importantly, the flames of resistance activity were fanned more effectively where Germans 
could listen to the BBC. For identification, we exploit quasi-exogenous variation in signal 
strength of the BBC. In the resistance data, we find that where news from London arrived 
together with Allied bombers, German resistance became markedly more likely. In terms of 
the magnitudes, with a one standard deviation increase in BBC availability, the Allies could 
have achieved the same effect on domestic opposition while reducing bombing by 25.3%. 
Our main contribution is to document and quantify the impact of bombing and foreign radio 
on domestic opposition and morale during the deadliest military conflict in history. Our paper 
is related to Dell and Querubin (2018). They show that US bombing in Vietnam reduced 
support for the Southern Vietnamese government, while increasing popular backing for the 
Vietcong. There, villages were bombed by their own government’s main ally. Our paper 
examines air attack by an enemy power intended to undermine citizens’ backing for their own 
government. In both cases, the regime’s failure to protect its citizenry resulted in less popular 
support. Our study sheds light on effective strategies against dictatorial governments, and it 
underlines the role of radio propaganda as a potential complement to bombing.  
We further contribute to three distinct literatures—the effects of media on political attitudes, 
the determinants of regime support, and the history of the air war during World War II. There 
is a growing consensus that media exposure can change political attitudes and voting 
behavior. Work by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) argues that newspapers mostly cater to their 
consumers, and exert little effect on their audience’s political views. Subsequent work has 
                                                
7 By using the term “aces”—shorthand for high-performing pilots—we do by no means wish to glorify their 
deeds, which served to keep a genocidal regime in power.  
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found numerous examples when media exposure influenced voting behavior, including Fox 
News in the United States (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007), NTV in Russia (Enikolopov, 
Petrova, and Zhuravskaya 2011), Berlusconi channels in Italy (Durante, Pinotti, and Tesei 
2017). In addition, an emerging literature looks at the effect of radio on more extreme forms 
of behavior. Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) demonstrates that radio propaganda was an important 
driver of violence against the Tutsi minority in Rwanda. Relatedly, Gagliarducci et al. (2020) 
argue that the BBC helped to coordinate partisan activity in German-occupied Italy during 
WWII, leading to more reprisals. However, they find no effects on the motivation of Italians 
to oppose the fascist regime.8 At the same time, Armand and Gomes (2020) document that 
radio can help to mitigate civil conflict in Uganda. Our paper contributes to this literature by 
showing that propaganda can be effective—even in the extreme case of encouraging 
resistance against one’s own government during a war with a foreign power. 
We also contribute to the literature on autocracies and their public support. Classic treatments 
like Arendt (1973) as well as Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) emphasize potential conflict 
between a small elite and the populace at large. Recent research has increasingly emphasized 
that dictatorships endure by co-opting one part of the population while repressing another 
(Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; 2007; Wintrobe 1998). Guriev and Treisman (2019) argue that 
propaganda and misinformation are common tools for dictators to ensure public support. 
Adena et al. (2015) show that German radio promoted electoral support of the Nazis and 
encouraged violence against Jews in late 30s.9 Also, people who have experienced state 
repression seem to reduce their support of authoritarian governments (Iwanowsky and 
Madestam 2019, Bautista et al. 2020). While some historians have emphasized the Nazi 
regime’s popularity as a result of plunder and exploitation after 1939, others underline the 
importance of totalitarian surveillance and repression, ranging from local party 
representatives to the secret police (Gestapo) and concentration camps (Evans 2008; Aly 
2005). Our paper furthers this literature by examining the role of military destruction and 
foreign propaganda on the support for an autocracy at war. 
By examining the efficacy of bombing, we also relate to the economic history of war. Many 
historians have questioned the effects of bombing. Allied victory in World War II is mainly 
                                                
8 One potential explanation is that Italy had relatively few listeners—there were less than 1 million of radio sets 
in 1938  (Briggs 1995) and 1.02 million in 1944 (Laden 2018).  
9 We cannot survey the vast literature on the rise of the Nazi party here. Among recent contributions, Spenkuch 
and Tillmann (2018) argue that religion played an important role in ensuring Nazi party support. Satyanath et al. 
(2017) argue that social capital facilitated transmission of Nazi beliefs before 1933.  
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attributed to the Western powers’ economic superiority and the Red Army’s sacrifices on the 
battlefield (Harrison 1998; Beevor 2012; Hastings 2011). Following skepticism by the one of 
the chief authors of the Strategic Bombing Survey’s, the economist John K. Galbraith, several 
historians have emphasized that German industrial production continued to surge under the 
hail of bombs unleashed by Western Allies—and that the population did not turn against the 
Nazi government. Both Hastings (2013) and Overy (2014) argue that the effects on morale 
were disappointing from the perspective of the US and UK air forces, and that armament 
production was not affected significantly. In contrast, O’Brien (2015) argues that the 
logistical demands of both sea and air battle undermined Germany’s war effort. Along similar 
lines, some scholars see an important role of the bomber offensive in undermining the 
Luftwaffe’s fighting strength (Keeney 1988). There is no agreement about the effect of air 
power on the morale of the German armed forces. The Wehrmacht fought hard until the very 
end of the war, despite heavy bombardment at home and on the front (Kershaw 2016). 
Therefore, it appears that devastation at the home front failed to undermine the troops’ 
fighting spirit (Hastings 1981).  
To sum up, we make the following contributions to the existing literature: we show that 
bombing had important effects, generating domestic opposition while depressing 
servicemen’s morale. This is in line with the main aim of aerial bombardment in World War 
II, which was to increase opposition against the Nazi regime (Overy 2014). Second, we find a 
synergistic effect with radio propaganda. This is important because there is, until now, no 
empirical study on the topic.10 Both the BBC and the UK government believed in the 
effectiveness of its German service; media historians have doubted its effect (Pütter 1986, 
26). Our findings show that bombing and broadcasts in combination were particularly 
effective in creating opposition, while the effect of radio alone was rather limited. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides historical background. 
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 summarizes the results for bombing. Section 5 
provides further evidence on the impact of radio propaganda and its interaction with bombing. 
Section 6 concludes. 
                                                
10 The related paper by Gagliarducci et al. (2020) examines radio as a means to coordinate partisan activity, not a 
tool to instigate opposition. 
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2. Historical Background 
In this section, we summarize key aspects of the historical background—the history of aerial 
bombardment and its effect on production and civilian morale, BBC radio propaganda, and 
combat motivation in the German armed forces.   
The military use of air power 
After World War I, many strategists believed that future conflicts could be won by air power 
alone.11 According to this view, future wars would involve the massive use of aerial 
bombardment against civilian populations: “the man in the street [should] realize that there is 
no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed… the bomber will always get 
through. The only defense is in offence, which means [to] kill more women and children 
more quickly than the enemy…Stanley Baldwin, Prime Minister” (emphasis added, Hastings 
2013). The German bombing of Guernica during the Spanish civil war added urgency to these 
predictions. By the autumn of 1940, after failing to win air superiority, the German air force 
began to bomb London, Coventry, and other British large cities. The Royal Air Force in turn 
attacked Berlin and other German cities. The RAF’s  Bomber Command received a high share 
of available resources, reaching a maximum of almost 2,000 operational planes by the end of 
the war. Bomber Command flew more than 300,000 sorties against Germany resulting in a 
loss of around 8,000 aircraft and 55,000 air crew killed (Davis 2006). 
Once the US joined the Allied war effort, the strategic bombing of German industry and cities 
intensified.12 By the end of the war, the 8th and 15th US Air Forces in Europe each employed 
more than 150,000 men and could field up to 1,000 bombers plus 800 escort fighters. USAAF 
lost 20,000 men over Europe, flying 410,000 missions. In combination, the US and UK air 
forces dropped more than 2 million tons of bombs during the period 1942 to May 1945, losing 
some 14,000 aircraft in the process (Davis 2006).13 
The US initially emphasized precision bombing. Because of poor weather conditions in 
Europe14 and fierce German defense,15 the USAAF eventually switched to area attacks. 
                                                
11 The Italian general Giuli Douhet was the most prominent proponent of this view, publishing a book (in Italian) 
entitled Command of the Air (Douhet 1921) 
12 The US was unique in having a four-engined bomber in production when World War II began, the B-17 
“Flying Fortress.” In the UK, such aircraft were still on the drawing board; in Germany, they would mostly 
remain there for the rest of the conflict. 
13 Of these, 1.2 million tons were dropped on Germany.  
14 On Sept. 6, 1943, the 8th US Air Force sent a force of 338 bombers to attack Stuttgart. Only 262 planes made 
it to Germany; out of these, only 46 attacked Stuttgart because of dense cloud over the city. The other planes 
diverted to alternative targets including Karlsruhe and Offenburg, about 100 km away. 
 8 
Ultimately, it devoted twice as many bombs to attacking city areas as to ‘precision bombing’ 
(Ross 2003). As the German air force declined in strength, Allied bombing accelerated—more 
than three quarters of all tonnage was dropped in the last 12 months of the war (Overy 2014). 
Bombing’s military and industrial consequences  
The main military effect of strategic bombing was to divert artillery and German fighter 
aircraft to the “home front” (Hastings 2013). By the end of the war, 12,000 heavy guns and 
more than 400,000 men and women were employed in flak units all over Germany (Hastings 
2013). More than half of Germany’s front-line fighters were sent back to defend the Reich 
against air attack. Fighting the RAF and USAAF in the skies over Germany devastated the 
Luftwaffe, leading to an accelerating decline of air support for her armies (Keeney 1988).  
Attacks on the oil industry and on rail transport after the summer of 1944 made troop 
movement increasingly difficult, and hampered training (Overy 2014).16 The effect of 
bombing on armament production is harder to assess. Immediately after the end of the war, 
the United States conducted a detailed survey, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey 
(USSBS). It employed over 1,100 officers and civilian experts, including John Kenneth 
Galbraith. The study found that German armament production numbers had surged during the 
war. German output of aircraft, tanks, and guns only peaked in the second half of 1944, when 
the intensity of bombing reached its highest level. The USSBS conducted numerous detailed, 
plant-level analyses. There were several cases of significant reductions of actual production, 
but these were typically short-lived. Clearly, area bombardment was ineffective in reducing 
production. The great attack on Hamburg in July 1943 destroyed over 300,000 dwellings and 
killed 40,000—and yet, only the equivalent of 1.8 months of industrial production were lost 
as a result. Albert Speer, the German Minister of Armaments and War Production, predicted 
at first that production would collapse if the Hamburg attack was repeated six more times—
but was astonished to see how quickly output recovered (Hastings 2013). The British 
bombing survey estimated that area attacks never reduced German production by more than 
7%, and that its effect was possibly as low as 1% as late as 1944 (Overy 2014).   
                                                                                                                                                   
15 In the famous raids on the Schweinfurt ball bearing factories in October 1943, the USAAF used 376 B-17s. Of 
these, 147 were shot down. In a second raid, 60 USAAF aircrafts were destroyed and 142 were damaged, out of 
291 employed. 
16 Many of the planes, tanks, and artillery pieces produced during Speer’s “armament miracle” in 1943 and 1944 
never reached the front line because of the rail network’s collapse. Once these weapons were in the Wehrmacht’s 
hands, many had to be abandoned for lack of fuel, also made a priority target in 1944 (Beevor 2016). 
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Bombing and civilian morale 
Pre-war strategists had envisaged air power as a war-winning weapon because of its expected 
effect on morale. Next to the goal of reducing military production, both the German bombing 
of Britain, and the Allied bomber offensive against Germany, were designed to destroy the 
population’s will to resist. This is especially true of the RAF’s strategy of nighttime attacks on 
German population centers.  
Regular, massive bombing raids on Berlin during the RAF’s “Battle of Berlin” (1943–44) 
seemingly undermined the regime’s prestige. At the start of the war, Hermann Göring, the 
head of the German air force, had boasted that if a single bomb were to fall on Berlin, people 
could start calling him Meier. Throughout the later years of the war, Berliners commonly 
referred to air raid sirens as “Meier’s trumpets” (Hastings 2013). Massive raids undermined 
beliefs in final victory. Hermann Göring himself, while witnessing B-17s over Berlin in early 
1944, told a confidante that Germany had had lost the war (Overy 2014).   
Numerous Germans resisted the Nazi regime, but—apart from the military plotters on July 
20th, 1944—never got close to actually seizing power. There was no mass uprising and no 
collapse at the front during the Second World War, as there had been in 1918. This failure to 
destroy the Germans’ will to resist is often seens as proof that Allied strategic bombing was 
fundamentally flawed.17 At the same time, anecdotal evidence shows that support for the 
regime was heavily dented by the devastation of German cities. After the fire bombing of 
Hamburg in July 1943, the German security services reported that across the Reich, all 
“feeling of security” had collapsed (Stargardt 2015). Indeed, for several months after the 
Hamburg raid, Gestapo reports point to a generalized belief that the war was lost, and that the 
Nazi leadership had to go—as happened to Mussolini in Italy at the same time. While the 
acute crisis in 1943 passed, aerial attacks dented the belief in victory: Open criticism of the 
war and the regime became common-place, Nazi party members were set upon in the streets, 
and open contempt for the air force leadership became common (Evans 2008). The fact that 
bombing did not lead to mass opposition against the regime may therefore tell us more about 
the repressive powers of the government than the failure of strategic bombing to undermine 
morale.  
                                                
17 Major Alexander Seversky, of the USAAF, concluded in 1942 that “it had been generally assumed that aerial 
bombardment would quite quickly shatter popular morale … it now seems clear that despite large casualties and 
impressive physical destruction, civilians can “take it.” On the whole, indeed, armed forces have been more 
quickly demoralised by air power than unarmed city dwellers.” (Hastings 2015, p. 458). 
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BBC German services and radio technology 
Germany was a country of radio listeners—there were 9 million registered receivers by 1938, 
growing to over 16 million in 1943 (see figure F.1 in Appendix F). Some estimates indicate 
that by January 1938, half of all households possessed a Volksempfänger (people’s 
receiver).18 This also meant that Germans could and did listen in large numbers to foreign 
radio, the BBC in particular, despite the fact that this activity was strictly prohibited by the 
government. According to Briggs (1995, p.11) the BBC “did more than any comparable 
agency both to pull together different elements of resistance in each separate European 
country - by giving news... by providing ideas and inspiration and at certain stages by passing 
on operational orders—and to spread relevant information between countries.”  
In contrast to German and Soviet propaganda, the BBC maintained a high standard of 
journalistic probity. Its broadcasts included timely and accurate information about the course 
of the war. This included open admissions of defeats and failures, such as the fall of Dunkirk, 
which enhanced the BBC credibility with German listeners (Somerville 2012). BBC 
programming also aimed to uncover German propaganda lies in a bid to undermine support 
for the Hitler government, and included popular items such as messages from German 
prisoners of war. Programming focused on exposing Nazi lies and propaganda.  
The BBC recruited prominent speakers such as the writer and Nobel laureate Thomas Mann. 
Mann addressed the bombing in his radio broadcasts: 
“Hitler is boasting that his Reich is ready for ten, even twenty years of war. I assume 
that you Germans have your own ideas about that—for example, that after a fraction 
of this time no stone will stand on top of another in Germany.”19  
Overall, during the war, the BBC (1944) felt that “Germans listen to London and take 
seriously what they hear.” Over time, more and more Germans turned to it as a reliable source 
of information (Evans 2008, p.576). There was an important synergy between radio 
propaganda and the air war. In the words of the Morale Division’s report in the USSBS, 
“Black [illegal] radio listening and disbelief in official propaganda increased steadily during 
the last 2 years of the war… Bombing had much to do with the final discrediting of 
propaganda and of the Nazis because it brought home to millions the tangible proof of almost 
                                                
18 Plock (2020). 
19 Translation from English version edition: Mann, Thomas (1943), Listen, Germany! . 
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unopposed Allied air power, indisputable proof completely at variance with familiar Nazi 
propaganda…”  
In Germany, listening to “Radio London” (and many other foreign broadcasts) was strictly 
prohibited. Every radio receiver came with official stickers warning listeners of severe 
penalties for anyone tuning in to foreign stations. Violating the ban on listening to enemy 
stations was punishable by imprisonment or, in case of additional spreading of foreign 
propaganda, by death. To block the BBC reception, a number of jamming transmitters were 
installed, but they were apparently largely ineffective (Klingler 1983, p.56). Despite 
prohibitions and penalties, anecdotal evidence suggests that many Germans tuned in secretly 
to the BBC. While accurate estimates are impossible to obtain, the Gestapo estimated the 
number of listeners to the London Christmas program in 1941 at around 1 million (Klingler 
1983). By 1944, the BBC guessed that 10-15 million Germans were listening (Kaufmann 
2013).  
From its start in 1938, the BBC German Service broadcast on medium wave frequencies, 
using transmitters in south-east England. Short wave technology was well-developed by the 
1930s, but the number of compatible German receivers was kept low on purpose; owners 
were placed under observation. Those who purchased parts to build powerful receivers were 
routinely reported to the Gestapo (Weidenhaupt 2001, p.56). The people’s receiver, the most 
popular radio set in wartime Germany, did not offer short-wave reception. Both the main 
German radio program as well as the BBC German Services were transmitted on medium 
wave.  
Therefore, we confine our attention to medium wave transmissions. As one media historian 
argued: 
“The German broadcast of the BBC was the first and for a long time the only program 
for the Reich which could be transmitted via medium-wave and which was strong 
enough to reach the famous “man in the street” in the first place.” (Pütter 1978, p.127). 
To identify the effect of the BBC we rely on the exogeneity of radio reception. The quality of 
the BBC signal was largely determined by distances to transmitters and topography. The 




Resistance against the regime took a variety of forms. Even trivial offences such as jokes 
about the party and leadership were officially considered treasonous.  More serious were 
comments about the course of the war and the possibility that Germany might lose, or anti-
regime graffiti and the circulation of flyers—a crime against the people’s will to resist, in 
Nazi parlance, a crime punishable by death. Even more important were attempts to sabotage 
the war effort, aiding the escape of prisoners of war, and the like. The most serious form of 
resistance were attempts at violent overthrow of the government. Our data covers the entire 
range of opposition activities, and includes the conspirators of the July 1944 plot to kill Hitler 
and overthrow the regime. 
Soon after the Nazis came to power, they put in place a powerful secret police, the Gestapo, to 
stamp out subversive activities. Under the overall control of Heinrich Himmler and the SS, 
the internal security apparatus quickly won the war on crime and reduced all organized 
opposition networks to impotence (Evans 2005). By the late 1930s, there was almost no scope 
for internal resistance. Only after the start of World War II did some measure of resistance 
activity reemerge, often centered on working class neighborhoods where the Communists had 
polled strongly before 1933. 
Widespread skepticism about the effectiveness of air power and propaganda can be 
rationalized by the fact there was no mass uprising against Nazi rule, and that no attempt to 
overturn the regime was successful. At the same time, it Hitler was the subject of no fewer 
than 42 documented assassination attempts  – possibly a world record (Berthold 1997). 
Morale in the German military  
The fighting spirit of Germany’s armies was relatively high during much of the war (Van 
Creveld 2007). Nonetheless, bombing of the home front seemingly undermined military 
morale. Soldiers on home leave witnessed the destruction of their hometowns and 
experienced air raids. Others received news from their families: 
“With the increasing bombing attacks on German towns, and the heavy civilian losses, 
the morale of troops is badly affected. Every day, soldiers receive news of the 
destruction of their homes, the tragic death of wives and children. They return from 
leave depressed.” (Hastings 1981). 
In 1944, Berliners joked that volunteers for the Eastern front had to be cowards, because life 
was less dangerous there than at home. For airmen in particular, the destruction of German 
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cities was a severe blow to their status: every bomb that landed on German soil demonstrated 
the Luftwaffe’s weakness (Evans 2008).  
3. Data 
In this section, we briefly describe our data sources and discuss basic patterns. Note that 
summary statistics for key variables used in the analysis are shown in Table A.1 in the 
Appendix A. More details on data sources can be found in Appendix G. 
Resistance. To measure resistance, we digitize high treason court cases held during the years 
1943 and 1944. This yields data on almost 2,000 accused individuals who stood trial before 
the People’s Court. This court was established in 1934 outside the normal legal structure, after 
the German Supreme Court had offended the Hitler government by acquitting all but one of 
the defendants in the famous Reichstag fire case. Charged with prosecuting political crimes 
and staffed by hand-picked Nazi judges, it handed down a large number of death sentences 
during the war (Geerling, Magee, and Brooks 2013; Geerling et al. 2018). 
All cases in our dataset concern political opposition. Defendants include members of the 
“White Rose” resistance movement—the group of Munich students around Hans and Sophie 
Scholl—as well as some of the conspirators of the July 20, 1944 plot. In the sample there are 
at least 53 individuals accused of planning, assisting, or executing 5 distinct plots to 
assassinate Hitler. Overwhelmingly, however, the accused are ordinary citizens whose trials 
(and frequently, death) left little trace in the public consciousness. Charges include 
undermining Germany war-making powers (Wehrkraftzersetzung), work slowdowns, 
defeatism, and treason.  
For each of our court cases we collect information from the trial documents about the start of 
resistance, the time of arrest, place and type of resistance, and if there was any mentioning of 
radio listening. We find evidence of resistance in 532 distinct locations in 1943 and 192 in 
1944. Because of the lag between the start of resistance activity and arrest (and further delays 
until the case was brought to trial) there are effectively no cases that began in 1945. We 
exclude the ones we find in the records.20 Our main variable—new resistance—is measured 
monthly at the city level.21 We show the location of the resistance cases on the map in Figure 
                                                
20 Indeed, there is only one such case in 1945: resistance in Stettin. The court itself was hit hard by the bombing 
of Berlin in March 1945, when its head judge, Roland Freisler, was killed in a USAAF raid. 
21 We aggregate resistance cases at the monthly level since in many instances the exact date of the start of 
resistance is somewhat vague. 
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1. Resistance took place all over the Germany.22 The timing of the resistance and the 
distribution of time between the beginning of resistance and the date of arrest are summarized 
in Figure 2.  
Bombing. We use detailed information on the tonnage of bombs dropped on all German 
locations, based on (Davis 2006). In our regression discontinuity design analysis, we use both 
the intensive and extensive margin of bombing. In panel analysis, we exclude places with no 
bombing in either 1943 or 1944, to avoid making an inference based on locations that were 
never bombed. We depict the location and intensity of bombing on the map in Figure 3. Note 
that we only include locations inside Germany in its pre-1938 borders in our main data 
sample. The circle shows the maximum range for bombers flying from East Anglia.23 The 
histogram in Figure A.2 also shows that although Allied bombing began in 1941, it intensified 
in 1943–1945. 
Sample. We perform analyses at two different levels. Our main results are based on the 
sample of German cities, and some of our results are based on the sample of districts (Kreise). 
The city sample consists of 936 places. It includes all cities over 20,000 inhabitants plus other 
places being bombed plus places of resistance (place of living). For small places next to each 
other (or next to a larger city), a rule of thumb of 5 km (straight line) is used to merge them 
together (or to a larger city). For example Rheinhausen, Rheinhausen/Krupps, 
Duisburg/Rheinhausen, Friemersheim, Ruhrort, Meiderich are all merged with Duisburg. 
Places outside of the pre-1938 Reich boundaries24 are dropped. Also places that are further 
than 120 km from the nearest weather station are dropped to ensure the reliability of weather 
data.  
German Pilots. The data on fighter pilots come from the claim registry of the 
Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (Air Force High Command—OKL). The OKL fighter claims 
list was extracted by Jim Perry and Tony Wood from microfilms of the handwritten records of 
the Luftwaffe Personalamt stored at the German Federal Archives (Bundesarchiv) in Freiburg. 
This data is supplemented by information from the Kracker Archive. Because some OKL 
fighter claims records did not survive the war, Tony Wood augmented the list with claims 
                                                
22 Some observations from other countries are deliberately not included in our main sample. Note that in our 
main regressions, we use the log transformation (+1) of resistance variables to avoid losing zeros. 
23 For simplicity, we use distances from Chelmsford, in East Anglia. The vast majority of allied bomber airfields 
were located in East Anglia (cf. Appendix A Figure A.1). 
24 See https://web.archive.org/web/20170709100924/http://censusmosaic.org/data/historical-gis-files for exact 
historical German boundaries.  
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from other published sources—such as Donald Caldwell’s (1996) JG26 war diary—to obtain 
a comprehensive list of German fighter claims for the years 1939–1945.25  
From these records, we take information for 352 high-scoring pilots whose place of birth is 
known. While we do not know whether pilots’ families still lived there, this is the only 
information on pilots’ home towns. Also, by focusing on high-performing pilots, we are 
measuring the impact amongst soldiers responsible for the vast majority of aerial ‘victories’—
the top 5% of pilots accounted for one third of Allied aircraft shot down. 
Other Socio-Economic Controls. We also use other district level socio-economic 
information from the 1925 and 1933 censuses, including shares of Jews and Catholics, blue- 
and white-collar workers, WWI participation, property tax, welfare recipients; political 
preferences in terms of voting in 1933; city status of the district; access to other sources of 
information: German radio signal strength, newspapers in the 1930s, and the number of 
cinemas. 
USSBS Moral Division Survey. In addition, we assemble data from the post-war survey 
conducted by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Morale Division. Over 3,700 
individuals were surveyed between March–July 1945 in 34 cities all over Germany, including 
seven never bombed cities, and excluding the Soviet zone of occupation. While earlier studies 
have only used the aggregated responses from the USSBS, we located all individual returns 
and digitized them. Amongst other items, the survey asked when and whether the person had 
started listening to Allied radio—around 50% of respondents answered in the affirmative. The 
survey also questioned people about when they thought the war was lost, and their views of 
the Nazi leadership, the reasons for losing the war, and people’s assessment of the post-war 
situation.  
BBC Reception. In order to measure BBC reception in Germany, we collect information on 
BBC transmitters used to broadcast German services: their location (mainly in South-East 
England) and their power.26 We predict BBC radio availability—the strength of radio signal, 
for 1943–1945 for every German locality, using information on the location and power of 
transmitters derived from the irregular terrain model (Hufford 2002; Olken 2009). 
                                                
25 For more information about Tony Wood’s combat claims list and the Kracker Luftwaffe Archive, see 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130928070316/http://lesbutler.co.uk/claims/tonywood.htm and 
http://www.aircrewremembered.com/KrackerDatabase/. 
26 There were no significant changes in the power over time in the time studied. 
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As is standard in the literature on radio’s effects, we exploit information on actual listening as 
a function of reception quality. This yields an S-curve, with listenership declining rapidly 
below a threshold value of acceptable reception quality.27 We unfortunately do not have 
systematic data on listenership to the BBC to estimate radio listening directly. Instead, we use 
self-reported listenership to the BBC from the USSBS to examine diffusion patterns. As 
Figure 4 suggests, people were able to listen to BBC with signal strength far below the 
conventional threshold, and we do not observe a flat tail on the left-hand side of the 
distribution (probably because people were willing to tolerate a noisy signal to obtain 
information). At the same time, the curve flattens out around the -8 threshold.28 In what 
follows, we use the estimated relationship, as presented in Figure 4, to create a non-
parametric function of signal strength to predict BBC listening.29 
Weather data. Weather data is available for 146 weather stations all over Germany at daily, 
6-hourly, or hourly frequency for pre-war and war years (www.kachelmannwetter.com). We 
use data on wind speed for 1943–45. We interpolate this data for the sample of 936 towns and 
cities using a standard interpolation procedure (Pebesma 2004; Pebesma and Wesseling 1998; 
Acemoglu, De Feo, and De Luca 2020) and exclude cities further than 120km from the 
closest weather stations. Due to data availability, the interpolations for 1943 are based on 6-
hourly weather reports, while for 1944, we use hourly reports; in both cases we first run the 
interpolations and then take an average for each day.30  
4. Results: Bombing 
In our main analysis, we exploit variation in bombing intensity over time and space to explain 
resistance against the regime. Figure 5 gives a first impression: resistance in the top quintile 
of bombing volume was approximately 12 times higher than resistance in the bottom quintile, 
rising from 0.09 cases per month per million people to 1.14.  
However, this correlational evidence should not be interpreted as causal: even though Allied 
bombing was highly inaccurate, it was not random. Omitted variables like military value, 
                                                
27 More precisely, we use the predicted signal strength and combine it with the information on actual listenership 
to infer acceptable levels of reception quality time. Other papers use similar functional forms (Olken 2009; 
Yanagizawa-Drott 2014; Adena et al. 2015). 
28 Note that signal strength on our scale is mostly negative. It means that the quality of reception was not as good 
as modern-day standards imply. At the same time, Figure 4 suggests that listeners were willing to accept this 
lower quality for listening to foreign radio during the war. 
29 Figure A.3 also reports the geographic distribution of our measure of BBC availability. 
30 Note that our panel regressions always include time fixed effects to deal with the concern of potentially 
different data quality over time. 
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population density and pre-existing skepticism vis-a-vis the Nazi regime could potentially 
explain this strong association. In order to eliminate those confounding factors, we use 
complementary sources of variation to deal with potential unobserved heterogeneity. We first 
report cross-sectional results from a spatial discontinuity-based exercise. Next, we exploit 
weather-induced variation in panel data. Finally, we analyze data from the victory records of 
German fighter pilots, analyzing how bombardment of their hometowns affected 
performance.  
Basic Patterns: Bombers’ Combat Range and the Geography of Resistance 
We first exploit technical limitations of WWII aircraft for identification. Allied aircraft could 
not reach all German targets with equal ease. Aachen, on the Dutch border, is a mere 250 
miles (405 km) from East Anglia, where most Allied bombers were stationed during 1939-
1945. In contrast, Königsberg is 850 miles (1,368 km) away. The RAF’s Lancaster bombers 
had a long range and could reach most German cities. In contrast, the American B-17—an 
older plane repeatedly upgraded with armor and numerous defensive weapons—had a more 
limited combat range. The official history of the US Army Air Force in World War II states:  
“A typical mission by B-17s in the European theatre in 1944-45 would take them to 
Berlin, Munich, or Leipzig. From their airfields in East Anglia, the bombers would 
have a practical radius of 600 or 700 miles with a bomb load of 4,000 or 5,000 
pounds… Longer missions were occasionally flown… with reduced bomb loads…” 
(Craven and Cate 1948).31 
The value stated by the USAAF—600 miles—coincides with the maximum monthly range of 
attacks (with a full bomb load) flown by the US 8th Air Force (985 km). In Appendix H, we 
summarize how technical characteristics of B-17s, together with operational conditions, 
created this threshold. In our analysis, we consider all cities at a distance of less than 985 km 
to East Anglia to be within range of the 8th USAAF. 
Figure 3 above shows a map of Europe with the maximum combat radius of B-17 bombers 
shown as a circle. As the map suggests, most of the bombing indeed occurred within B-17 
range, with some occasional attacks outside the 985 km radius. Table 1 summarizes the 
extensive margin of bombing: Of the 149 cities in our sample outside the normal range of B-
17s, only 14 were bombed at all—a rate of less than 10%. In contrast, out of the 875 cities in 
                                                
31 The first operational model, the B-17B, had an effective combat range of 600 miles (Craven and Cate 1948). 
While later models had larger fuel tanks and better engines, the weight of armor and defensive armament also 
increased. Operating conditions in general made distances flown shorter than expected: “Prewar statistics on 
range of aircraft were generally found to be exaggerated when actual wartime experience brought home to the 
AAF the great host of factors affecting combat radius of action.” (Craven and Cate 1948).  
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the sample within range, 53% were bombed—an increase in relative risk by a factor of more 
than 5. The frequency of resistance per million inhabitants also jumped sharply in cities that 
were ever bombed: from a frequency of 0.08 in towns without bombing and outside the range 
of B-17s to 1.08 in those bombed and in range.32 Again, this raw comparison ignores potential 
differences between industrial cities in West versus East Germany. Because cities were 
deliberately targeted and not bombed at random, we next perform an RDD analysis.   
To proceed, Figure 6 shows a heatmap of bombing and resistance within and outside of the B-
17’srange.  Panel A demonstrates that most bombing occurred within 532 nautical miles (985 
km) circle around the East Anglia airfields; it declines discontinuously when the maximum 
combat radius was reached. Similarly, panel B indicates that resistance was more likely to 
occur in places within the combat range of B-17 bombers, compared with places just outside 
the circle.33  
To go beyond the visual evidence, we denote resistance as Ri, distance to B-17 maximum 
range as Di, and maximum bombing range as . We estimate  
      (1) 
where  are month fixed effects, capturing time-varying characteristics. The optimally 
chosen bandwidth (Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2012) is 201 km. Table 2 reports the results of 
this regression discontinuity analysis. Figure 7 shows the results graphically, zooming in for 
an even smaller bandwidth. The numerical analysis implies that with a simple RDD and a cut-
off of 985 km, we observe a 3.0% higher number of monthly new cases of resistance in range 
of B-17 bombers (column 1), significant at the 5% level, and equivalent to 44% of a standard 
deviation. At the same time, average bombing was 0.156 log points higher within B-17 range, 
significant at 5% level, and equivalent to 24% of a standard deviation (column 2). Results 
from implementing a fuzzy RDD design, using bombing as the running variable imply that 
the elasticity of new resistance cases with respect to bombing is 0.191 (column 3, significant 
at 1% level). In other words, a doubling of bombing tonnage led to a 19.1% higher frequency 
of resistance, on average. 
                                                
32 The rate of resistance is even a little higher in towns bombed but outside the range of B-17—but these were 
very rare. This suggests that bombing carried out by the RAF had similar effects to USAAF bombing. 
33 Two-dimensional versions of these graphs are also summarized in Figure A.4 in Appendix A. We also report 
the results of a McCrary test (McCrary 2008) in Figure A.5 in Appendix A. Even though the density of the 
population in general declines as the distance to East Anglia increases, there is no discontinuous jump in density 
at the threshold. Also, we should note that, as shown in the heatmap in Figure A.6, average city size does not 
seem to decline with distance, with perhaps exception of Berlin. 
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Some additional checks demonstrate the validity of our approach. For example, we also show 
the results for alternative cut-offs of 140km and 260km in Table A.2 of the Appendix A; the 
coefficient of interest for fuzzy RDD is broadly stable across specifications.34 Table A.4 
reports that the results are robust to donut specifications and excluding particular locations 
close to the maximum range,  like Berlin or Munich. 
Panel Results and Identification 
The RDD estimates based on the B-17’s combat radius suggest that bombing increased 
resistance. At the same time, unobserved characteristics of cities (like military importance) 
could be correlated with both a population’s willingness to oppose the regime in power and 
geographical distance. This might create bias in our analysis. To deal with this possibility, we 
introduce a complementary identification strategy, which exploits the panel structure of the 
data and allows us to control for time invariant characteristics of cities. Note that even with 
fixed effects of cities taken into account, OLS estimates are still likely to be biased—
strategically important cities were bombed earlier. At the same time, these cities might also be 
more likely foci for resistance. We therefore pursue an instrumental variable strategy. 
We use the weather as a plausibly exogenous source of variation in bombing intensity. 
Specifically, we interact average daily wind across Germany with each city’s distance to East 
Anglia. Wind has an effect on the speed and ultimately, on the range that aircraft could fly 
with a full load. The 8th USAAF (1945) summary of tactical conditions states (p. 90) that “...a 
strong wind at this altitude ... further reduced the effective radius of operations.”35 Therefore, 
on days with strong wind, planes were more likely to bomb targets closer to their bases.36  
The first stage results, reported in Table 3, confirm our logic: there is a negative relationship 
between wind and bombing for locations relatively far from East Anglia, while the 
                                                
34 Similarly, Table A.3 shows that for smaller bandwidths other potentially confounding variables do not jump 
for the lowest bandwidths considered. 
35 A tailwind increases outbound speed. On the return journey, the aircraft then faces a headwind. However, the 
effect is not symmetric. For example, a tailwind equal to planes’ cruising speed would cut their time to target in 
half, but they would never return. Therefore, the stronger the wind is, the larger is the reduction in effective 
range.  
36 While clouds could be considered an alternative source of exogenous variation, they have opposing effects on 
bombing. On the one hand, they make it harder to find targets. On the other hand, they protect the bombers from 
being observed directly by anti-aircraft gun crew. There is no obvious relation to the flying range. The same 
holds for rain. Both perform poorly as an instrument in daily data. Therefore, we confine our attention to the 
interaction between wind and distance as an instrument. 
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relationship turns positive for closer targets.37 We also find that it is wind conditions on the 
day of the bombing and the day before—but neither earlier nor later—that predict tonnage 
dropped on a target.38 The effect of bombing on the day after can be explained by several 
factors: a direct effect on the bombing after midnight for planes that took off before midnight, 
and the indirect effect since the planning which targets to attack was often made on the day 
before and was influenced by weather conditions and wind speed on the early day being 
correlated with the wind speed on the evening before. Overall, the results in Table 3 
demonstrate that bombing was influenced by day-to-day variation in wind speeds.  
Next, to exploit variation over time in the intensity of bombing and the frequency of 
resistance, we estimate the following equation: 
                                   (2) 
where  is a measure of new acts of resistance in city i in month m, Bombing is measured in 
tons of bombs dropped, and we include month and city fixed effects. We take natural logs of 
bombing tonnage and resistance variables (plus one in both cases). Because Bombingim is a 
potentially endogenous variable, we instead report the results from the two-step procedure 
with bombing predicted from variation in the daily wind strength, as summarized in Table 3. 
Then, to be able to estimate equation (2) at the monthly level, we aggregate daily bombing, as 
predicted from the daily weather following specification in column 4 in Table 3, to the city-
month level.39  We cluster standard errors by city and month.40  
Table 4 presents the results of this estimation. Bombing led to a higher number of new 
resistance cases (column 1 of Table 4): a 100% increase in bombing tonnage predicts a 4.8% 
increase in the number of new resistance cases. Similarly, we find that bombing increased the 
probability of having at least one resistance case (column 3 of Table 4) by 3.8% following 
                                                
37 The opposite is true for locations that are closer to England. Specifically, we estimate the following non-linear 
equation  our daily data, which allows the 
effect of the wind to have a different sign depending on whether a target was relatively close or far from London. 
We find that for small distances, the effect of the wind on bombing was positive, while for large distances this 
effect turns negative (see the effects of wind for various percentiles of distL, computed in the last rows of Table 
3).   
38 The coefficient for the day of bombing is significant at the 1% level (column 4 of Table 3). In contrast, the 
coefficients are one third in size and far from significant 1/2/3 days before or 2/3 days after the actual date of the 
attack. 
39 Numerically, we compute mean values of predicted bombing for each city and month, taking city and month 
fixed effects into account. We then take a natural log of this measure, to avoid uneven impact of outliers. 
40 We also report the results of estimation with Conley standard errors (Table A.5 in the Appendix). 
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100% increase in bombing tonnage induced by weather variation, with coefficients being 
significant at 5% level in all the columns of this table.41 
Could the effect of bombing on resistance be explained by more Gestapo activity after a raid? 
We focus on new resistance cases (and not ongoing ones), mitigating  this concern.42 
Nevertheless, to rule out this possibility, we collected data on the number of arrests in each 
month and place, and control for the number of arrests in columns 2 and 4 of Table 4. The 
coefficients for arrests are numerically small and far from statistically significance. 
Furthermore, although arrests are included in the specification, they hardly change the 
coefficient for bombing (e.g. 0.48 without this control in column 1, 0.49 with a control for 
arrests in column 2). Thus, we conclude that contemporaneous Gestapo activity is unlikely to 
explain the estimated effect of bombing on resistance.43 
We also investigate pre- and post- trends in resistance in Table 5. Future bombing does not 
affect contemporaneous resistance activity, and, moreover, the effect seems to be 
concentrated precisely during the month of bombing, not later. The main takeaway message 
from this table is that there are no significant pre-trends in resistance before bombing actually 
took place.44  Also, there  is no significant heterogeneity in the effect of bombing with respect 
to pre-existing political preferences or racism (Table A.7).  
Overall, the results in Tables 3–5 suggest that bombing created more resistance—in line with 
our findings from bombing range-based discontinuities (subsection 4.1). Note, however, that 
the panel IV identification strategy only allows us to estimate LATE, i.e. the effect of 
bombing driven by weather conditions on a given day. The true effect of bombing probably 
lies between 4.8% (panel IV estimates) and 19.1% (RDD estimate) for a 100% increase in 
bombing tonnage. 
                                                
41 In Table A.6 in Appendix A we also report results from OLS regressions that are likely biased as explained 
above. The OLS coefficients are negative but not significant. That is consistent with the premise that more 
military important cities, which also tend to have higher growth in resistance, got bombed first (when total 
bombing volume was lower), thus masking the relationship between bombing and resistance. 
42 Only in 12.5% of resistance cases in our sample did the arrest occur in the same month as the start of 
resistance. 
43 We also analyse the geography of bombing and resistance within Berlin. We estimate the effect of bombing on 
resistance using grid cell month variation, controlling for grid cell and time fixed effects. The assumption is that 
the Gestapo was equally active in all parts of Berlin, sidestepping the issue of the timing of persecution. This 
data and corresponding results are discussed in the Appendix B.   
44 We also investigated pre-trends for arrests in Appendix C, Table C.1. 
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Bombing and fighter pilots’ performance 
So far, we have examined the impact of bombing on domestic opposition; bombing arguably 
encouraged Germans already opposed to the regime to take action. In this section, we study 
the impact of bombing on the performance of leading German fighter pilots—i.e. in a 
population with, on average, positive attitudes towards the regime. Figure 8 shows that pilots 
hailed from all over Germany, while the airfields from which they flew covered all of 
occupied Europe and the European part of Soviet Union. 
As the war wore on, an increasing number of fighter pilots’ hometowns were hit by Allied 
bombing. We examine the performance of each fighter pilot as a function of his individual 
ability (a personal fixed effect Ci), experience (in months), front (East or West), as well as 
squadron (Sit), aircraft (Ait), and time fixed effects (Kt): 
       (3) 
where V is the number of ‘victories’ by pilot i in month t, Front is a dummy that takes the 
value of unity if the pilot was posted to a squadron on the Eastern front, Experience is 
measured in months since entry into our database, and Bombing is a dummy that takes the 
value of unity after a pilot’s home town has been bombed for the first time.45 Standard errors 
are clustered by pilot.46 Analogously, we estimate eq. (3) with the standard Cox model for 
exits (death, missing, POW, or wounded and not returning to combat). 
Table 6, Panel A, shows the results. Pilots performed less well after their hometown was 
bombed for the first time. On average, the pilots in our data shot down 1.94 enemy planes per 
month. After the bombing of their hometown, their monthly tally declined by 0.42–0.57 
aircraft when we estimate with pilot fixed effects. Even when controlling for pilot, time, and 
squadron fixed effects, we still find a decline in monthly victory rates of 0.42, or almost a 
quarter of the average success rate per month. In terms of the magnitudes, hometown 
bombing in 1942-1944 accounted for 1006 less enemy airplanes shot, or 22.5% decline (based 
on column 4, Table 6A specification) .47  
Note that the distribution of standard errors for our explanatory variable ‘home town bombed’ 
                                                
45 Note that the time distribution of first bombing of pilots’ hometowns was largely uniform over the period of 
our study (Figure A.7 in Appendix A). 
46 We also report the results of estimation with double clustering by pilot and month in Table A.8 in the 
Appendix. 
47 The counterfactual applies to the 352 aces in our data. If the effect applied similarly to all German fighter 
pilots, the overall decline would be even larger (German pilots with at least one victory claim shot down 54,829 
Allied aircraft. A 25% reduction for 22.5% of the sample of pilot-months would translate into the 2,775 planes 
‘saved’. 
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may be non-standard, since it reflects an absorbing state. To deal with this issue, we employ 
randomization inference: we create randomly-assigned bombings of home towns, generate 
placebo treatments, and run this against actual monthly victory rates of pilots 1,000 times. 
The results are displayed in Figure 9. Our OLS coefficient lies at the extreme lower end of the 
distribution of simulated coefficients. This is underlines the statistical significance of our 
results. 
In our difference-in-difference estimation, all untreated pilots effectively act as the 
comparison group for the ‘treated’ pilot whose hometown was bombed. In a setting with 
substantial heterogeneity in performance across pilots (and over time), this is not ideal. To 
demonstrate the robustness and size of the treatment effect, we also use synthetic control 
group analysis. Here, for each treated pilot i, we form a comparison group of pilots that (with 
appropriate weights) performed similarly to i in the period leading up to the treatment 
(Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2010). In our particular case, with different treatments at 
different points in time, we use the modified synthetic control approach of Xu (2017), based 
on interacted fixed effect models.48  
Figure 10 reports the result of this estimation. In panel A, we plot the month-by-month 
deviation in victory rates between pilots whose home town is bombed at t=0, and those pilots 
whose pre-bombing performance is similar. Panel B displays the cumulative effect. The effect 
of bombing is immediately visible at t=0, and then grows in magnitude. The maximum 
deviation is almost 2 aircraft per month, suggesting a 100% decline of performance at its 
lowest point. The change remains significant even 30 months after a pilot’s first home-town 
bombing. At a horizon of 20 months, the total cumulative effect amounts to 20 fewer enemy 
aircraft shot down (Figure A.9). Overall, both the evidence from standard diff-in-diff analysis 
and synthetic control methods suggests a major reduction in the motivation of high-flying 
German soldiers in response to (home town) bombing. 
After a pilot’s hometown was bombed, pilots’ exit rates also declined (Table 6, panel B). The 
vast majority of exits in our data are caused by death – but the variable can also reflect pilots 
being shot down and taken POW, wounded and not returning to combat, or MIAs. We find a 
marked reduction in the risk of exit, by between a quarter and over 40%.49 The combination 
                                                
48 Note that our data is heavily imbalanced because of pilot entry and deaths (cf. Figure A.8). 
49 Since death is an absorbing state, we cannot estimate with pilot FE; Cox regressions with time FE do not 
converge.  
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of lower ‘victory’ rates and fewer exits implies that bombing reduced motivation and effort, 
reflected in less risk-taking and ‘success’.  
One obvious concern is that pilots may have been stationed near their hometowns, and that 
their own operations were accordingly interrupted by bombing raids. Figure 8 shows the 
location of Luftwaffe airfields used by pilots in our data as well as their hometowns. The vast 
majority of pilots operated from airfields far away. Also, the analysis in Table 6 uses a simple 
indicator of bombing in a pilot’s hometown, coding the month of the first attack and all 
subsequent months as unity. Could the effect instead be cumulative, rising in magnitude; or 
conversely, were there diminishing returns from ever more attacks? Figure A.10 plots the 
coefficient on home town bombing when we split the order of attacks into 1st-5th, 6th-15th, and 
>15th, controlling for pilot and time fixed effects.50 We also augment our estimation from 
Table 6, restricting the sample to pilots whose current airfield (at the time of the bombing 
attack) was at least 250, 500, or 750 km away from their home town. The coefficient rises in 
size with distance, suggesting that operational disruptions after bombing raids are not 
responsible for declining performance. Coefficients are significant at the 90% level 
throughout. If anything, the magnitude of the effect increases as ever more attacks hit a pilot’s 
hometown. 
According to narrative reports, when air attack destroyed the hometowns of servicemen, their 
morale often suffered (Hastings 1981). The quantitative evidence on German fighter pilots 
demonstrates the size of this effect – the more the cities of the Reich turned into heaps of 
rubble, the fewer victories even Luftwaffe aces scored, and the smaller the risks they took.  
5. Radio and Resistance  
So far, we have analyzed the impact of bombing on resistance as well as the motivation of 
German soldiers. This section studies the effect of the BBC German service on opinions using 
the USSBS survey. We also test whether radio availability led to more resistance and examine 
the interaction of propaganda and bombing. First, we investigate how radio reception was 
related to self-reported BBC listening as stated in the USSBS survey. 
                                                
50 The results of this analysis are also summarized in Table A.9 in the Appendix.  
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Listenership to BBC and Perceived Bias of German propaganda  
In this section, we analyze the impact of BBC signal strength on both self-reported 
listenership to foreign radio and Germans’ perception of bias in information provided by the 
German government, as derived from the USSBS.51 We estimate the following equation: 
                                                                                 (4) 
where  is a self-reported opinions of respondent i in city c,   is a measure of BBC 
availability, as described above, and X ic is a vector of individual level controls. The 
identifying assumption is that BBC availability only affects individual’s opinion through 
listening to BBC.52 Standard errors are clustered at city level. 
Table 7 summarizes these results. Odd columns report the results without additional controls, 
while even columns also add individual controls. Higher BBC availability based on signal 
strength translated into higher listenership of Radio London (columns 1–2) as well as of any 
Allied radio station (columns 3–4).53 A one standard deviation increase in BBC availability 
led to 10.1% increase in the probability of (reported) listening to Radio London, and a 7.9% 
increase for any Allied radio station.  
Furthermore, BBC listening decreased people’s confidence in German government 
propaganda. Columns 5–6 report this relationship either without or with demographic 
controls. Column 6 suggests that a one standard deviation increase in BBC predicted 
availability predicts a 21.8% increase in people reporting self-perceived bias in German 
information. This result is consistent with radio changing people’s evaluation of information 
from various sources.54 
Radio Reception and Resistance 
Did better radio reception of Radio London lead to more resistance? We first examine the 
effect of signal strength, and then analyze interaction effects with Allied bombing.  
                                                
51 As discussed above, the USSBS survey may suffer from social desirability bias. At the same time, we do not 
expect this bias to vary systematically for cities in our analysis. 
52 In Table A.10 in the Appendix, we report how survey demographics were related to BBC availability. 
Consistent with our identifying assumption, we did do find a significant relationship.  
53 Respondents sometimes could confuse foreign radio stations. We therefore show the results for listening to 
Radio London and to any Allied radio station separately. 
54 We present further results based on USSBS data in Appendix D. In particular, we find that the earlier people 
self-report starting to listen to the BBC, the earlier they held the belief that the war was lost or wish to end the 
war, in a panel framework controlling for individual fixed effects (Table D.1). We also find that both exposure to 
BBC and its interaction with bombing were associated with markedly different opinions about the war, the 
Nazis, and occupation (Table D.2).  
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We start by looking at the direct effect of predicted BBC radio availability on resistance. The 
results indicate that it had a positive effect on resistance, significant at 10% level (Table 8, 
columns 1–3) once pre-existing political preferences are controlled for. The effect is relatively 
small, with a one standard deviation increase in BBC signal availability leading to a 0.32% 
increase in resistance.55  
Next, we study complementarities between BBC availability and bombing intensity. Column 
4 of Table 8 summarizes the results of the corresponding panel estimates. We use a 2SLS 
specification, predicting bombing volume from wind speed, as discussed earlier. This 
suggests a positive interaction between bombing and BBC radio reception: radio and bombing 
reinforced each other. The magnitude implies that for the highest level of BBC availability, a 
doubling of bombing led to an 8.3% increase in resistance. For the lowest value of BBC 
availability, the effect of bombing is close to zero; it is not significant at conventional levels. 
Put differently, a one standard deviation increase in BBC availability across Germany would 
have generated the same level of domestic opposition, even if bombing had declined by 25%.  
6. Conclusions 
Can air power and propaganda contribute to victory? Or are drone strikes on suspected 
terrorist camps, for example, counterproductive, resulting in the recruitment of yet more 
terrorists (Shah 2018; Kattelman 2020; Piazza and Choi 2018)? We examine the effect of 
Allied bombing and propaganda on domestic resistance against the Nazi regime in WWII 
Germany. US and British bombing increased internal resistance against the Nazi regime. 
Despite the Gestapo’s effectiveness and the Nazi regime’s propaganda prowess (Evans 2008), 
we find that a combination of Allied radio propaganda and military force fanned the flames of 
resistance in Germany’s ruined cities; it also sapped morale at the front. The more German 
cities burned and turned into rubble, and the more Germans could listen to the BBC, the 
clearer it became that the war was lost – and the more likely active acts of domestic resistance 
became (USSBS 1945).  
We exploit spatial variation in bombing and radio coverage to support this argument.  In 
addition, we use variation in the intensity of bombing over time. Exogenous variation in 
bombing driven by weather conditions demonstrates that the effect is arguably causal. In 
                                                
55 Given that we can only estimate functional form of S-curve using USSBS survey, and jamming being used to 
depress the quality of the signal, this measure is likely to be noisy, thus our coefficient here is likely to be 
underestimated. 
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addition to instigating resistance against the Nazi regime, bombing decreased the combat 
motivation of German fighter pilots, undermining the performance of Germany’s military 
machine. Effects were large: The magnitudes imply that a 100% increase bombing led to 
19.1% higher resistance in the RDD specification, and to 4.8% higher resistance in the panel 
specification. When a pilot’s hometown was bombed, his monthly rate of destroying Allied 
aircraft fell by 20-30%.  
Bombing became more effective when combined with BBC propaganda. Using terrain 
characteristics to identify exogenous variation in radio listenership, we demonstrate that 
German government strictures against listening to foreign stations were issued with good 
reason: foreign radio created more resistance, especially in those towns and cities where 
bombing was heavy. The message that Germany was losing the war became more convincing 
under a hail of bombs (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008)(Marcus et al. 2005). In the 
USBSS survey, Germans exposed to BBC radio held markedly more pessimistic views about 
the course of the war. Our results imply that a one standard deviation increase in BBC 
listening had the same effect on domestic resistance as a 25% increase in bombing tonnage. 
Since the bombing of Germany claimed the lives of an estimated 360,000 civilians in 
German, and of 76,000 Allied airmen, this implies a potential ‘saving’ of 112,000 lives.  
The effectiveness of history’s second-greatest bombing campaign, and of allied radio 
propaganda, has largely been dismissed in the historical literature: no mass uprising took 
place in Germany during World War II, and no attempt to overthrow the regime was 
successful. Nonetheless, we argue that city attacks worked as intended, crushing the morale of 
the German people. While the overall course of the war was not altered by domestic German 
opposition, we can gain insight into the general effects of bombing from the German 
experience. The ultimate failure of air attack to instigate major unrest largely reflects the Nazi 
government’s capacity to suppress opposition. In other words, the Gestapo’s ruthlessness and 
efficiency ensured that bombing and propaganda did not map into an effective domestic 
resistance movement. Bombing also had important military knock-on effects – it undermined 
the fighting spirit of the German army, as evidenced by the declining motivation of fighter 
pilots; and it caused the Nazi regime to divert artillery and fighter aircraft to protect the Reich 
on a major scale. As in the case of Vietnam (Dell and Querubin 2018), the government’s 
failure to protect its citizens from bombing undermined its legitimacy. Foreign air attack, 
especially when combined with the effective use of mass media, can bring people to resist 
their own government – even against heavy odds, and at the potential price of their lives.  
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Figure	2. Start of new resistance by month and duration of resistance activity, in months. 
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Note:	 The	 two	maps	 show	 bombing	 volume	 (in	 logs)	 for	 1943-44	 (Panel	 A)	 and	 the	 incidence	 of	
resistance	(p.c.)	using	1938	population	as	a	scaling	variable.	Darker	areas	were	bombed	more	heavily	
and	 showed	more	 resistance.	 Areas	 of	 Germany	 in	 1938	 in	 darker	 color.	 Dots	 indicate	 towns	 and	
cities	in	our	dataset.	We	exclude	annexed	Austria	as	we	do	not	include	it	in	our	study.		
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Note: The histogram reports regression coefficients from a randomization exercise. We randomly assign home 
bombing to pilots’ hometowns 1,000 times, and run this variable against actual victories. Coefficients reported are from 
















In B-17 range No 135 14 149
Yes 412 463 875
In B-17 range No 142 7 149
Yes 761 114 875
In B-17 range No 0,08 1.4 0.2



























Sharp	RDD Fuzzy	RDD Sharp	RDD Fuzzy	RDD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
In	range 0.030** 0.156** 0.030** 0.156**





Month	Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes









































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Average	wind	x	Distance	to	London 0.227 0.181 0.081 0.583*** 0.598*** 0.279 -0.069
[0.194] [0.194] [0.193] [0.193] [0.194] [0.194] [0.194]
Average	wind	x	(Distance	to	London)^2 -0.275 -0.267 -0.226 -0.718*** -0.642*** -0.266 0.066
[0.236] [0.236] [0.235] [0.235] [0.235] [0.236] [0.236]
City	Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month	Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full	effect	of	wind	at	minimum	of	distance 0.047 0.028 -0.008 0.118 0.138 0.071 -0.017
p-value	of	full	effect	of	wind	at	minimum 0.265 0.498 0.855 0.005 0.001 0.091 0.680
Full	effect	of	wind	at	25th		percentile	of	distance 0.038 0.014 -0.031 0.095 0.129 0.072 -0.018
p-value	of	full	effect	of	wind	at	25th	percentile 0.318 0.711 0.425 0.014 0.001 0.063 0.652
Full	effect	of	wind	at	50th		percentile	of	distance 0.021 -0.008 -0.059 0.048 0.098 0.064 -0.015
p-value	of	full	effect	of	wind	at	50th	percentile 0.521 0.813 0.074 0.144 0.003 0.057 0.648
Full	effect	of	wind	at	75th		percentile	of	distance -0.005 -0.039 -0.094 -0.022 0.045 0.046 -0.011
p-value	of	full	effect	of	wind	at	75th	percentile 0.880 0.283 0.009 0.541 0.218 0.211 0.770
Full	effect	of	wind	at	maximum	of	distance -0.109 -0.152 -0.213 -0.297 -0.177 -0.036 0.010
p-value	of	full	effect	of	wind	at	maximum 0.325 0.169 0.053 0.007 0.110 0.747 0.928
Observations 684,216 684,216 684,216 684,216 683,280 682,344 681,408
R-squared 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
Note:	Robust	standard	errors	in	brackets.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.	Distance	to	London	is	measured	in	1000s	of	kilometers.
Table	4:	Bombing	(Predicted	by	Weather)	and	Resistance	
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Predicted	Bombing 0.048** 0.049** 0.038** 0.038**
[0.021] [0.022] [0.017] [0.017]
Log	(Arrests) -0.032 -0.000
[0.033] [0.025]
City	Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month	Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,464 22,464 22,464 22,464






















City	Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month	Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hometown Bombed -0.175* -0.572*** -0.472** -0.437* -0.422*
[0.094] [0.212] [0.204] [0.25] [0.251]
Experience -0.009*** 0.0117***    
[0.002] [0.0040]    
Eastern Front dummy 1.690*** 1.841*** 1.425*** 1.250*** 1.258***
[0.070] [0.137] [0.162] [0.175] [0.178]
Pilot Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes
Squadron Fixed Effects    Yes Yes
Aircraft Fixed Effects Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 1.94 1.94 1.94 1.94 1.94
Observations 13983 13983 13983 13957 13957
R-squared 0.041 0.137 0.205 0.233 0.235
Panel B:
(1) (2) (3) (4) 	
 
homebombed_ever 0.753* 0.775 0.763* 0.569***
-0.117 -0.121 -0.119 -0.115




Mean of Dependent Variable 0.0154 0.0154 0.0154 0.0154
Observations 13983 13983 13983 13983
Robust standard errors, clustered by pilot id, in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Unit of observation 
is pilot-month. Exponentiated coefficients from Cox regressions in Panel B.  Exit is defined as KIA or 
severely wounded. 
Table 7. Bombing at Home and Pilot Motivation





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
	 	
BBC	Radio	Availability 0.650* 0.500* 0.631* 0.533* 0.451*** 0.462***
[0.350] [0.275] [0.321] [0.290] [0.135] [0.128]
Demographic	controls 	 Yes 	 Yes 	 Yes
Observations 2,282 2,272 2,282 2,272 1291 1277
Number	of	Cities 34 34 34 34 34 34













OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BBC	Radio	Availability 0.019 0.028* 0.031*
[0.012] [0.017] [0.017]
BBC	Radio	Availability	*	Predicted	Bombing 	 	 	 0.144*
	 	 	 [0.087]
Predicted	Bombing 0.094**
[0.041]




Month	Fixed	Effects 	 	 	 Yes
Observations 865 865 865 	 22,296








APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES 
Figure A. 1: Map	of	USAAF	8th	AF	airfields.  
  
 
Figure A. 2: BBC	Radio	Predicted	Availability	over	German	territory. 
 
 
Figure  A.3: Bombing, Resistance, and Distance to Chelmsford, East Anglia. 
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Figure A. 5: Population	distribution	in	Germany.  
 
 
Note: The area of each dot is proportional to the size of a city. The black line indicates the maximum operational range of B-
17 bombers operating from East Anglia, as described in the text.  
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Figure A. 7: Timing of First Bombing – Home Town of Pilots 
 
Figure A. 8: Unbalanced	sample	–	fighter	pilots.	
 
Note: The figure shows, for a subset of the pilots in our dataset, the evolution of treatment 
status – pre-periods for treated(blue), treated period (black), potential control units (gray) that 
are not treated, and missing data (white).  
Figure A. 9: Effect of Bombing on Fighter Pilot Performance, by Distance to Home Town 
	 	
Note: The figure plots the coefficients from three separate regressions, with a pilot’s monthly victory rate on the 
left-hand side. The bars show coefficient for three “home town attacked” dummies, coded separately to 
distinguish the 1st-5th attack from that of the 6th-15th and the 16th and further attacks. The excluded category is 
no-attack. We include individual pilot fixed effects and cluster at the pilot-month level.  We restrict the sample 
to a) pilots flying from airfield more than 250 km from their home town, b) more than 500 km, and c) more than 
750 km. The blue bar shows the error band for 99% significance; the thinnest black bar, for 95%; and the thick 





Panel A. Daily Analysis Variables. 
   N min Mean Median max St.Dev 
Daily Bombing Tonnage 684216 0 1.14 0 10449.04 41.836 
Distance from London 684216 434.074 725.256 718.107 1166.435 161.159 
Average Wind 684216 1.039 3.714 3.295 14.033 1.835 
 
Panel B. Monthly Panel Variables.  
   N min Mean Median max St.Dev 
Log (1+ # of arrests) 22464 0 .011 0 4.543 .128 
Log (1+ # of new resistance cases) 22464 0 .008 0 3.526 .107 
Monthly bombing, predicted from weather 22464 0 1.018 1.05 1.211 .12 
At least one new resistance case 22464 0 .008 0 1 .09 
Log(mean monthly bombing) 22464 0 .109 0 6.48 .56 
 
Panel C. Fighter Pilots  
   N min Mean Median max St.Dev 
 Eastern Front 13983 0 .516 1 1 .5 
 Experience 13983 1 23.515 21 69 15.843 
 Victory 13983 0 1.94 0 68 4.3 
 Hometown Bombed 13983 0 .165 0 1 .372 
 
Panel D. RDD  
   N min Mean Median max St.Dev 
Distance from East Anglia 1024 414.998 792.534 772.449 1509.832 214.452 
Within range 1024 0 .854 1 1 .353 
Log (New Resistance Cases), avg 1024 -.008 0 -.008 1.869 .066 
Log (monthly bombing), avg 1024 0 .278 0 6.225 .631 
 
Panel E. Cross Sectional variables. 
   N min Mean Median max St.Dev 
 Log (Population), 1938 920 8.236 10.945 10.901 15.208 .724 
 Nazi vote share, 1933 876 13.293 44.859 44.454 83.006 12.465 
 SPD vote share, 1933 876 .011 .162 .157 .464 .091 
 KPD vote share, 1933 876 .002 .09 .076 .36 .062 
 Turnout, 1933 876 72.064 88.888 89.389 96.039 3.241 
 Welfare recipients, 1932 907 3.5 25.754 23.4 93.9 14.491 
 Social Renters per capita, 1932 907 1.043 8.83 7.932 33 5.035 
 Log (Property Tax), 1930 894 2.805 6.311 6.45 8.446 .761 
 Log (New Resistance Casess) 936 0 .007 0 1.558 .056 
 BBC Signal Availability 936 -1.341 -.165 -.116 -.08 .115 
 German Radio Availability 936 .052 .27 .26 .75 .104 
 
Panel F. USSBS Variables  
   N min Mean Median max St.Dev 
 Gender 3579 0 .611 1 1 .488 
 Age 3579 1 6.845 7 101 8.123 
 Married 3578 0 .711 1 1 .453 
 HighSchool 3561 0 .226 0 1 .418 
 Listened to Radio London 2282 0 .393 0 1 .488 
 Listened to Allies 2282 0 .501 1 1 .5 
 Perceived Bias in German Sources 1291 0 .125 0 1 .331 
Table	A.2:	RDD	and	Different	Thresholds.	
 
Threshold: 140	km 160	km 180	km 200	km 220	km 240	km 260	km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log	(Bombing),	average 0.151** 0.190** 0.187** 0.191*** 0.165*** 0.182*** 0.174***
[0.069] [0.086] [0.075] [0.070] [0.056] [0.066] [0.059]







Bandwidth: 140	km 160	km 180	km 200	km 220	km 240	km 260	km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log	(Population) 0.324 0.267 0.277 0.289* 0.220 0.121 0.133
[0.203] [0.188] [0.178] [0.172] [0.166] [0.158] [0.156]
Nazi	(NSDAP)	Vote	Share,	1933 -3.540 -4.305* -4.338* -5.995** -6.282*** -6.280*** -5.757***
[2.740] [2.572] [2.485] [2.339] [2.309] [2.167] [2.150]
Communists	(KPD)	Vote	Share,	1933 0.002 0.006 0.010 0.017 0.013 0.010 0.012
[0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
SPD	Vote	Share,	1933 0.014 0.003 0.015 0.023 0.022 0.025 0.028*
[0.023] [0.022] [0.020] [0.019] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017]
Turnout,	1933 0.344 0.557 0.738 0.619 1.376 1.783* 2.269**
[1.333] [1.225] [1.180] [1.102] [1.085] [1.021] [1.010]
Welfare	Recipients,	1933 2.987 2.669 3.333 3.846 2.791 2.767 3.265
[4.311] [3.993] [3.790] [3.617] [3.497] [3.363] [3.301]
Social	renters,	1933 1.327 1.119 1.596 1.896* 1.591 1.592 1.821*
[1.319] [1.216] [1.154] [1.078] [1.041] [1.004] [0.977]
Property	Tax,	1930 0.144 0.144 0.106 0.195 0.215 0.194 0.230
[0.197] [0.182] [0.175] [0.165] [0.159] [0.150] [0.149]






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
	
Log	(Bombing),	average 0.223** 0.241** 0.360** 0.294*** 0.231*** 0.147** 0.189*
	 [0.103] [0.106] [0.151] [0.086] [0.085] [0.072] [0.109]






Table	A.5:	Bombing (Predicted by Weather) and Resistance. Conley standard errors. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Predicted	Bombing 0.048** 0.049** 0.038* 0.038*
[0.022] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022]
Log	(Arrests) -0.032 -0.000
[0.034] [0.021]
City	Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month	Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,464 22,464 22,464 22,464








(1) (2) (3) (4)
Predicted	Bombing -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
Log	(Arrests) -0.032 -0.001
[0.032] [0.025]
City	Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month	Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,464 22,464 22,464 22,464







(1) (2) (3) (4)
Predicted	Bombing 0.060** 0.050** 0.047** 0.053**





City	Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month	Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,032 8,928 22,032 8,928
R-squared 0.403 0.131 0.187 0.135










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hometown Bombed -0.175* -0.572*** -0.472** -0.437* -0.422*
[0.094] [0.212] [0.204] [0.25] [0.251]
Experience -0.009*** 0.0117***    
[0.002] [0.0040]    
Eastern Front dummy 1.690*** 1.841*** 1.425*** 1.250*** 1.258***
[0.070] [0.137] [0.162] [0.175] [0.178]
Pilot Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes
Squadron Fixed Effects    Yes Yes
Aircraft Fixed Effects Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 1.94 1.94 1.94 1.94 1.94
Observations 13983 13983 13983 13957 13957
R-squared 0.041 0.137 0.205 0.233 0.235
Table . Bombing at Home and Pilot Motivation. Double clustering
Number of enemy planes shot down
Robust standard errors, clustered by pilot and month, in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Unit of 
observation is pilot-month. Exponentiated coefficients from Cox regressions in Panel B.  Exit is defined as 
KIA or severely wounded. 
 
Table A.9: Bombing at Home and Pilot Motivation. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 all >250km >500km >750km 
1st-to-5th  -0.372* -0.193 -0.242 -0.354 
 (0.193) (0.228) (0.295) (0.387) 
     
6th-to-15th  -0.591** -0.606* -0.827** -1.175** 
 (0.300) (0.328) (0.412) (0.527) 
     
16th + -0.911** -0.999** -1.414*** -1.824** 
 (0.391) (0.483) (0.494) (0.714) 
     
front 1.418*** 1.516*** 1.859*** 2.165*** 
 (0.166) (0.185) (0.209) (0.243) 
N 13815 11459 9232 7084 
R2 0.205 0.214 0.223 0.239  
Note: The regression reports coefficients for the change in monthly victory rates of pilots, by order of attack  
on their home towns and distance from home town to pilot’s airfield. Standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 





(1) (2) (3) (4)
BBC	Radio	Availability -0.068 2.091 -0.276 -0.462
[0.196] [1.818] [0.287] [1.138]
Observations 3,579 3,579 3,561 3,573
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003
Robust	standard	errors	in	brackets,	clustered	by	city.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.	  
 
APPENDIX B: BOMBING AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF RESISTANCE IN 
BERLIN 
As the capital of Germany, Berlin was a prime target for allied bombers throughout the war. 
Bomber Command’s CiC, Arthur Harries, sought to destroy the city during the so-called 
“Battle of Berlin” (Nov 1943 to Mar 1944), ordering 16 massive raids. Bomber Command 
dispatched reconnaissance planes after every major raid, taking detailed aerial photographs. 
These were then used to compile destruction maps of major German cities. Cartographers 
hand-colored every destroyed building in blue in large transparent overlays of enlarged city 
maps. The collected damage assessments were collected in the so-called “Blue Books”.1  
Contemporary newspaper articles show the head of Bomber Command, Arthur Harris, 
examining the damage maps under the headline “The Brain Behind the Death of Berlin Look 
at His Work from Afar” (Figure B.1). 
Some of the maps contained in the Blue Books have survived the war. We digitize the one for 
Berlin, compiled in March 1945 (Figure B.2), and combine it with precise geo-referenced 
information on the location of resistance activity. Did areas that suffered from more aerial 
bombardment within Berlin witness more resistance against the regime?2 Data from March 
1945 is useful for our purposes since the massive destruction during the capture of Berlin by 
Soviet troops in April 1945 had not yet occurred—effectively all documented damage is the 
result of aerial bombardment.  
We use a finely-grained grid of 1,479 cells, corresponding to about 0.5km2 each. We can 
assign 130 resistance cases to the part of the Berlin map covered by the Blue Book. A first 
impression of the nature of the data can be gleaned from Figure B.3, which shows a bin-
scatter of the number of resistance cases against the (log) of bomb damage in a grid-cell: more 
resistance occurred where the bomb damage was the heaviest in Berlin. Nonetheless, it may 
well have been the case that district characteristics interacted with bombing volume (i.e. there 
might have been more bombing in workers’ districts where more industrial plants were 
located, and where sympathy for the Nazis was lower to start with).  
                                                
1 Analysts examined hundred of photographs taken after each air raids. They evaluated details like the shadow of 
a house to determine whether the roof had burned down. 
2 Unfortunately, there are no earlier damage maps that would allow us to assess changes over time.  
To deal with this issue, we exploit variation over time in bombing and resistance. Since we do 
not have panel data on the destruction of different neighborhoods of Berlin, we construct a 
time-varying measure of destruction of different neighborhoods by interacting the level of 
destruction of a particular grid cell in March 1945 with the monthly bombing volume for the 
whole Berlin.3  
Table B.1 reports the results. New resistance was more likely to occur in the months 
following intense bombing, with the difference between most heavily bombed grid cell and 
least heavily bombed grid cell leading to 1.8% more resistance cases at the mean value of 
bombing and 2.5% higher probability of having at least one resistance case at the grid cell-
month level.4 Overall, these results confirm our previous findings that bombing furthered 
resistance activity. 
 
Table B. 1: Damage from Bombing and Resistance in Berlin 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log	(Bombing	of	Berlin)*Final	Damage	to	Grid	Cell 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0003* 0.0003*
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Log	(Bombing	of	Berlin)	 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0008 -0.0003
[0.0004] [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0005]
Grid	Cell	Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter	Fixed	Effects 	 Yes 	 Yes
Observations 10,353 10,353 10,353 10,353
Number	of	grid	cells 1,479 1,479 1,479 1,479
Log	(1+Resistance	Cases) At	Least	One	New	Resistance	
Note:	Robust	standard	errors,	cllustered	by	gridcell	and	quarter,	in	brackets.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.	  
                                                
3 This approach is similar to the sift-share instrument used in the study labor demand shocks (Bartick 1991),  
import penetration (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013),   or immigration (Dustman, Schönberg, and Jan Stuhler 
2017). 
4 To get these numbers, we multiply the coefficient of interest for the interaction term by the difference in log 
total damage between most bombed and least bombed district and by the number of quarters since the beginning 
of 1943 till the end of the war.  
 




Figure B. 2: Berlin Damage Map from the „Blue Book“ (March 1945).  
 
Notes: Blue areas – destroyed or badly damaged; red contours: fully built-up residential areas; 
black contours: industrial areas; green: 40-70% residential. Source: Imperial War Museum.  
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APPENDIX C:  RESISTANCE, ARRESTS AND THE TIMING OF GESTAPO 
ACTIVITY 
In Table C.1 below, as recommended by Angrist and Pischke (2009) we examine lags and 
leads to see whether there is any evidence of pre-trends in terms of arrests. To this end, this 
table reports coefficients for bombing either 1 or 2 months before/after an actual attack. We 
do not observe a significant impact of bombing on contemporary arrests or for arrests 1 or 2 
months earlier. There is, however, some evidence that Gestapo arrests followed bombing 
attacks with a lag of one month (column 4), suggesting that 100% increase in bombing led to 
a 7.9% increase in arrests one month later. The rapid uptick in arrests implies that only a short 
time often passed between the beginning of resistance and arrest, in line with historical 














City	Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month	Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





                                                
1 The distribution of time to arrest is shown in Figure 2 of the main text. 
 
APPENDIX D:  BBC, BOMBING, AND PUBLIC OPINION – EVIDENCE FROM THE 
USBSS 
The USBSS 
We first use newly digitized data from the survey responses of 4,309 Germans interviewed by 
Allied investigators immediately after the end of World War II. Members of the staff of the 
USSBS carried out detailed interviews of the civilian population in bombed cities. This offers 
an opportunity to study public opinion about the war right after its end. Among other 
questions, USSBS survey asked the respondents when they started to listen to BBC (see 
Figure D.1 for the distribution of these answers). This allows us to relate some opinion 
questions to the timing of starting to listen to the BBC in a panel framework, controlling for 
individual fixed effects. Table D.1 reports these results. Panel A shows that the earlier people 
started listening to the BBC, the earlier they held the (self-reported) belief that the war was 
lost. There are no associated pre-trends. Similarly, Panel B shows a positive correlation 
between wanting the war to end beginning to listen to BBC. While these results are based on 
self-reported responses on timing, and need be interpreted with caution, they suggest that the 
BBC German service was associated with greater pessimism about the war among the 
German populace.  
However, we do not have a good source of exogenous variation to study the causal impact of 
bombing using this data: our survey cities (shown on the map in Figure D.2) were not 
sufficiently close to maximum B-17 bombing range to use the bombing range discontinuity, 
and the weather instrument is not informative in the cross section. Nonetheless, we can 
analyze basic patterns in the data, as presented in Figure D.3. 
In cities that were bombed more by the Allies, respondents report a higher frequency of air 
raids -- providing some external validation for our bombing measure (Panels A and B of 
Figure D.3). Moreover, there some suggestive evidence that respondents who experienced 
more bombing reported low overall levels of morale and were more likely to report passive 
attitudes towards Nazis (Panels C and D of Figure D.3).1 These results are broadly consistent 
with the results for bombing as reported in section 4 of the main text. 
Radio’s Effect 
Did wartime exposure to the BBC affect people’s opinions more generally? In Panel A of 
Table D.2, we instrument BBC listening with our city level measure of BBC signal 
availability. Essentially, the results from Table 7 (column 4) constitute the first stage of this 
estimation. These results are computed with the help of weak instrument robust confidence 
sets (Andrews 2017, Sun 2018), which are reported in the separate row under their 
coefficients. We find that, on average, people listened to Allied radio were more likely to 
think that the war was lost because of shortages or superior Allied air power (+29% and +31% 
in probability of agreeing). They also assessed the occupation experience more favorably 
(+94%). In Panel B of Table D.2, we report the results for bombing and BBC together, using 
OLS estimation.2 Consistent with our panel data results, listening in places where Allied radio 
reception was good and where the Allied bombed, respondents were more likely to state that 
the war was lost because of shortages or superior Allied air power, that the war was lost from 
the beginning, and they had passive attitudes towards Nazis. 
While self-reported attitudes after the end of World War II are not necessarily compelling 
evidence in favor of the effects of broadcasts and air power, we note that around 40% of 
respondents self-identified as Nazi supporters; this suggests that social desirability bias did 
not entirely distort survey responses. 
                                                
1 The morale index was constructed from 12 different subcomponents by USSBS survey personnel; it was 
intended to measure the level of ordinary people’s morale at the end of the war. 
2 Unfortunately, we cannot estimate this specification using IV, for two reasons. First, our weather instrument 
only works for short term fluctuations in bombing rather than for aggregate volumes. Second, in the specification 
with interactions, signal strength becomes a very weak predictor of self-reported exposure to BBC, with weak 
instrument robust confidence sets covering entire grid. 
Figure D.1: Listening habits to Allied broadcasts, reported by USSBS respondents.  
Figure D.2: Cities surveyed by the USSBS.  
 
 
Figure D.3: Bombing and USSBS survey data.  
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C. Bombing and Bombing Morale Score (higher value 
indicates lower morale) 
D. Bombing and attitudes to Nazis (passive 
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Attitude towards Nazis: passive acceptance, indifference, ignorance
 
 
Table D.1: Public Opinion in 1945 and Exposure to BBC. Panel Results. 
Panel	A.	Thought	war	was	lost	











Respondent	Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,795 9,060 11,325 9,060 6,795
Number	of	repondents 2,265 2,265 2,265 2,265 2,265
Panel	B.		Wanted	the	war	over











Respondent	Fixed	Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,501 8,668 10,835 8,668 6,501




























	 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Listened	to	Allied	radio 0.290*** 0.313*** -0.245 0.203 -0.012 0.942*** -0.259*
[0.182] [0.180] [0.320] [0.229] [0.281] [0.327] [0.134]
Weak	Instrument	Robust	95%	Confidence	Sets [	.055;	.958] [	.046;		.901] [-1.164;	.294] [	-.272;	.724] [-.819;		.461] [	.327;	1.815] [-.564;	.046]
Olea-Montiel	and	Pflueger	Effective	F-statistics 13.853 13.853 13.853 13.967 13.682 13.809 13.809
Observations 2,253 2,253 2,253 2,255 2,255 2,256 2,256






















	 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Listened	to	Allied	radio	x	Bombing	Tonnage	 0.002** 0.002** -0.002 0.003*** 0.003* 0.000 -0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000]
Listened	to	Allied	radio -0.049*** -0.038** 0.092*** 0.039* 0.121*** 0.039 -0.038***
[0.016] [0.018] [0.016] [0.022] [0.034] [0.024] [0.011]
Bombing	Tonnage -0.001* -0.001** 0.001 -0.002** 0.000 0.003*** -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Observations 2,253 2,253 2,253 2,255 2,255 2,256 2,256
Number	of	cities 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
Robust	standard	errors,	clustered	by	city,	in	brackets.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.	In	Panel	A,	levels	of	significance	are	reported	based	on	weak	instrument	robust	confidence	
sets.	In	Panel	B,	weak	instrument	robust	confidence	sets	do	not	consist	of	a	single	limited		interval,	thus	we	are	only	able	to	compute	OLS	esimtates.  





(1) (2) (3) (4)
BBC	Radio	Availability -0.068 2.091 -0.276 -0.462
[0.196] [1.818] [0.287] [1.138]
Observations 3,579 3,579 3,561 3,573





APPENDIX E: RESISTANCE SAMPLE 
The full sample consits of 1,944 individuals, 15,5% of them female. Of those, whose trial was 
completed before the end of WWII (1607 individuals)  44,2% received death penalty (but 
only 26% of females), 39% received a penalty of 6,3 year on average of work camp (plus 
were dishonored for usually the same duration), 8,5% were sentenced to, on average, 2.2 
years in prison, and 8,2% were found not guilty. 24.8% had some previous criminal records. 
The graph below shows the correclations between having a criminal record, the type of 
accusation, and the sentence. The duration of resistance is on average, 15 months. The time 
lag between the end of resistance and accusation is, on average 295 days, but it is skewed. 
Only 25% were accused within of 103 days, 50% within of 222, and 75% within of 390 days. 
The average time lag between the accusation and sentence was 72 days.  
Table E. 1: Summary statistics for the resistance sample 
  coun
t 
mean sd min max 
female  1944 0.155 0.362 0 1 
criminal record 1944 0.248 0.432 0 1 
acc. of high treason 1944 0.931 0.254 0 1 
acc. of undermining defensive capability 1944 0.167 0.373 0 1 
acc. of aiding the enemy 1944 0.509 0.500 0 1 
acc. of failure to disclose 1944 0.103 0.304 0 1 
sentenced  1607 1.000 0.000 1 1 
death penalty 1944 0.366 0.482 0 1 
work camp dummy 1607 0.390 0.488 0 1 
duration work camp 627 6.308 3.068 1 15 
prison dummy 1607 0.085 0.278 0 1 
duration prison 136 2.224 1.539 
0.3
3 10 
dishonor dummy 1607 0.381 0.486 0 1 
acquitted of a charge 1944 0.068 0.252 0 1 








difference between accusation and conviction in 
days 1324 71.850 50.901 0 455 
duration of resistance in months 1533 15.116 18.573 0 134 
Observations  1944     
 









-0.058 -0.534 -0.124 -0.203
acc. of failure
to disclose
0.110 0.182 0.158 0.267 -0.229 death penalty
-0.073 0.033 -0.150 -0.199 0.009 -0.524 work camp
-0.055 -0.179 -0.080 -0.102 0.325 -0.208 -0.189 prison
-0.072 0.028 -0.146 -0.194 0.007 -0.515 0.980 -0.186 dishonor




Example cases (short summary) as provided by the accusation and sentence documents: 
Berndhard K., a former lieutenant-colonel. Since the turn of the year 1943/44, he received 
hints about a planned assassination by his superior Stieff.  In May 1944, he brought 
explosives for the planned Hitler assassination to Berlin and continued to participate in 
preparations for the assassination attempt. He was kept up to date by Stauffenberg. Place of 
living: Zossen; Place of crime: Berlin; Resistance start: May 1944; Resistance end: July 1944; 
Date of accusation: August 1944; Date of court decision August 1944; He received death 
penalty 
 
Otto W. was a councilor at the police headquarters in Berlin before being drafted into the 
military. In March 1943 he allegedly wrote (but never sent) a letter addressed directly to the 
Fuhrer in which he asked for the Fuhrer's resignation so to stop the ongoing war. He wrote 
another note titled "Mission to Save Germany" addressed to known military men as well as 
important public figures. There, he called for peace negotiations with the Allies (Great Britain 
and USA) in order to overthrow the German government in a joint effort. He also tried to 
convince several high-ranking military officials to stage a coup against the Hitler regime. W. 
was arrested at the Swiss border in September 1943, when he attempted to flee. He was 
sentenced to death by the military court on 14 February 1944. 
Adam von T. was a co-conspirator of the Stauffenberg-assassination plot of 20 July 1944. 
Beginning in 1940 von T. used his position at the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin to get 
access to insider information and in order to participate in official business trips to foreign 
countries. Over time he established an extensive network of regime opposing military 
personnel and private citizens inside and outside of Germany. Closer to the planned 
assassination he attempted to make contact with the Allies so as to gain their support for the 
coming coup. von T. was also a member of the Kreisau Circle. The main objective of this 
group was to plan the restructuring of the government after the fall of the fascist regime. One 
of his last acts was to visit the exiled socialist Willy B. in Stockholm whom he approached 
concerning a government position in a post-Hitler era. After the failed coup the people's court 
sentenced him to death on 15 August 1944. 
The siblings Hans and Sophia S. were part of the student resistance group White Rose which 
originated at the University of Munich. After returning from the Eastern Front in the summer 
of 1942 Hans S. composed several leaflets in which he criticized the fascist ideology and 
reported on atrocities committed by the German regime, e.g. the mass murder of Jews. While 
Hans returned to the front, Sophia learned of her brother’s involvement in the activities of the 
White Rose and following Hans return in January 1943 she helped to produce and distribute 
6000 to 9000 copies of the leaflet "Appeal to All Germans". Most of the leaflets were mailed 
to University employees and students. Additionally, Hans put anti-fascist slogans ("Down 
with Hitler") and crossed-out Swastikas on walls of prominent Munich buildings like the 
University, National Theater, Ministry of Commerce and the Festival Theater. Hans and 
Sophie S. as well as other members of the White Rose were arrested on 18 February 1943 and 
sentenced to the death by the people's court on 22 February 1943. Place of living: Munich; 
Place of crime: Munich, Augsburg, Salzburg, Wien, Stuttgart; Start of resistance: Juni 1942, 
End of resistnace: February 1943. 
Robert H., Georg G., Herbert R. and Paul R. met regularly in Berlin to discuss the political 
situation and recent military developments.  At a meeting in July 1943 the group of academics 
(chemist, doctor, architect and dentist) agreed that they needed to take measures as Germany 
was about to lose the war. Hence, they founded a resistance organization "European Union". 
The organization's manifest—"Answer to all Fascists"—embraced communist and democratic 
ideology while at the same time condemning the Fuhrer and his fascist regime. The four 
members became increasingly involved in supporting Jews living illegally in Germany by 
providing housing, paying for living expenses and obtaining forged documents. Moreover, 
they tried to get in touch with Russian spies through foreign workers they recruited 
beforehand. Their activities were discovered in September and they were sentenced to death 
by the people's court on 16 December 1943. Resistance begin: July1943; Resistance end: 
September 1943. 
Richard L., a commercial clerk participated in the illegal activities of the communist 
organization "National Committee for a Free Germany (NKFD)". He distributed pamphlets 
for the NKFD in and around Leipzig. From 1943 to 1944 he held political discussions with 
fellow communists based on the information he acquired through foreign sources (radio 
stations, other pamphlets). In May 1944 he hid Friedrich K., a communist sympathizer and 
SPD operative who was on the wanted list, for two weeks in his apartment. L. was found 
guilty by the people's court and sentenced to death on 24 November 1944. 
Heinrich N., a former KPD member engaged with Soviet prisoners preparing a riot at the 
prison camp near Rodisfort. His occupation as a farmer and forestry worker allowed N. 
repeated contacts with Soviet soldiers who were forced to work in the fields. From 1942 to 
1943 he spread news about the war at the Eastern Front among the prisoners which he 
gathered by listening to foreign radio stations. He was aware that the prisoners waited for the 
right opportunity to riot and promised them help. In November 1943 he was discovered 
storing guns, ammunition and maps. N. was sentenced to death by the people's court on 19 
September 1944. Resistance begin: May 1943; Resistance end: November 1943. 
Hans L., a secondary school teacher in Hamburg criticized the biased reporting of the 
German media in front of his students. The father of one of his students (a lieutenant in the 
German air force) reported him to the authorities for making defeatist statements between 
August and December 1943. The following statements were reported: "It's all nonsense what 
is reported in the news. I don't believe any of it." "Back when the Brits retreated it was a sign 
of defeat on their part. Now that Germany did it, it is called a victory." and "One thing is 
clear: Someone will win this war. The question is, who." Moreover, L. tried to persuade his 
students to quit the Hitler Youth. On 26 July 1944 the people's court sentenced him to four 
years in prison, where he died of poor health in February 1945.  
The vicar Valter H. ran a circle dedicated to religious education in Hamburg which Carl G. 
(mechanic), Ludwig S.-G. (chapelmeister), Richard H. (clerk), Dietrich H. (teacher and 
corporal) and Werner W. (carpenter) were members of.  H. was already known to the police: 
He received a warning in 1942 for sending religious pamphlets to soldiers at the Front. The 
focus of the meetings was religious and political matters, especially the amorality of the Hitler 
regime.  At one such meeting in June 1944 S.-G. disclosed his disgust at the random attacks 
on London citizens which in his opinion were the work of the Anti-Christ and a sign that the 
Last Judgment has come. In the wake of the Stauffenberg-assassination attempt H. 
commented on the failure as follows: "Who knows what plans God made for Hitler. Maybe, 
He doesn't want his death to be that pleasant.", while mimicking a dreadful pain. H. further 
explained that under the given circumstances an attack on the Fuhrer was justifiable before 
God. The circle members got arrested in October 1944. 
Karl Z. (locksmith and caretaker) and Emma H. (accountant) were members in the 
communist group "Anti-Nazi German Popular Front (ADV)"1. Alongside other members, 
they produced a total of twelve leaflets and two editions of the newspaper "The Alarm 
Clock." Foremost, they advocated for an end to the war and the fascist regime. In summer of 
1943 the ADV started cooperating with the "Brotherly Union of Prisoners of War (BSW)."2 
The ADV provided members of the BSW with accommodations, food supplies, fake 
documents and weapons. The BSW consisted of escaped Soviet prisoners and former Red 
Armey soldiers. Their prerogative was to destabilize Germany from the inside and to be ready 
to take up arms in case of riots or the approach of the Soviet Army. Shortly after the BSW 
was discovered by the Gestapo in late 1943, the majority of ADV members were arrested as 
well. Z. was the only detained member to survive the war due to pleading insanity. The rest of 
the ADV was sentenced to death by the people's court in winter of 1944. 
Rudolf W. (driver) sheltered Erich V. in October 1944, knowing that the latter was a sought 
member of a communist organization that planned the violent overthrow of the fascist 
government. V. put W. in touch with other communist in Stettin and managed to recruit him 
for the cause. Since then W. took part in meetings where the attendees listened to foreign 
radio stations, talked about politics, discussed means to secure weapons and made fail-safe 
plans in case they were found out. In November W. fled his home after V. alerted him of the 
Gestapo's investigation into one of their acquaintances. Later, he was arrested by the police. 
He was sentenced to death by the people's court on 9 February 1945. 
 
 
                                                
1 Antinazistische Deutsche Volksfront (ADV). 
2 Bratskoje Sotrudnitschetswo Wojennoplennych, BSW. 
APPENDIX F:  RADIO 
Listeners in Germany 
Figure F. 1: Numbers of radio subscriptions in Germany (approximate number of radio receivers) and the 
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Table F.1. BBC German Service  Broadcast details 
GMT  
0400-0500  Workers' Programme 
0900-0915  News 
1200-1230  Miscellaneous 
1300-1315  Miscellaneous 
1400-1415  Aus der Freien Welt 
1600-1615  Forces' Programme 
1745-1800  Seamen's Programme 
1800-1830  News and Commentary 
2000-2020  News and Talks 
2100-2115  Austrian Programme 
0000-0015 News 
Notes: Example: The Daily Schedule of the German Broadcasts in 1942; source: Briggs 1970, 
p. 430 
 
Radio Listening – Anecdotal Evidence 
 
(wherever the German text precedes,  
author’s translation follows) 
 
To strengthen his broadcasting monopoly, Joseph Goebbels authorized the production of an 
inexpensive radio set, the “Volksempfänger” (“People’s Set”), which could tune in to regional 
stations via medium wave, and the national station, Deutschlandsender (Radio Germany), via 
long wave but which prevented listeners from receiving the short-wave transmissions issued 
by foreign broadcasters. 
Vike Martina Plock (2020) 
 
Mann also reminded Sherwood that she was “too familiar with the situation in Germany and 
German-occupied countries, as not to realize the futility of the short-wave enterprise” for 
which she had been commissioned to write. There “exist only five groups of people who 
possess short wave receivers” in Germany, she stated, a fact she had “repeatedly pointed out” 
(Mann to Sherwood, 1). These are “Nazi officials, big industrialists, air-men, navy-men, and 
radio-professionals,” and for that reason it seems “a hopeless enterprise” “to write short-
wave-propaganda for the German middle classes” or “talk . . . to Germany’s women via short-
wave” as these listeners owned the specially designed “Volksempfänger” (“People’s Set”), 
which could not receive programs on short-wave frequencies (1–2). To “devote one’s time 
and strength to the making of ‘propaganda’ which cannot be heard,” Mann concluded, “is 
sadder than to write poetry exclusively for one’s own drawers” (2). 
Vike Martina Plock (2020) 
 
Only the longer short-wave bands could be used effectively for transmission over relatively 
short distances and only a minority of listeners in Europe had short-wave receivers. 
Pawley (1972) p.253 
 
The NSDAP rulers’ fear of the subversive effect of enemy propaganda and their low 
confidence in their self-assertion can be seen from their commitment to interfere foreign 
broadcasting with technical measures. All radios were sold without receiver for short waves, which 
disabled to receive 95% of all foreign radio. For the People’s receiver VE301 and of the German small 
receiver these technical constraints were already considered in their development and production from 
1933 to 1935. These cheap devices were produced without a short wave receiver. The others who were 
under suspicion of a shortwave receiver were monitored (Putter, 1978, p.127). Thereby radio dealers 
should report people to the Gestapo, who buy such parts.  
Wittek (1962) p.39 
 
BBC foreign services in German was broadcasted using short, middle and long waves. 
However, Volksempfänger and Kleinempfänger (the later version of the popular radio) owned 
by the most of the population was technically not able to receive short wave broadcasting. 
The few individuals owning older and more expensive receivers allowing reception of short 
waves were under observation and those who purchased replacement parts to build such 
powerful receiver were to be reported to Gestapo.  
Weidenhaupt (2001) p.56 
 
The first black stations had been ostensibly run by secret resistance groups inside the 
countries at which they were directed. Anyone with an apparatus to locate the source of radio 
signals could quickly unmask the pretence but few of the intended audience were so equipped 
- even supposing that they had the short-wave sets needed to receive the programmes at all. 
Balfour (1979) p.97 
 
So great has become the influence of the BBC that the Germans gave orders that all sets in 
the large towns of the ' Protectorate' of Bohemia and Moravia must be brought in so that they 
might be made incapable of receiving short waves. 
BBC (1944) p.77 
 
BBC was the first broadcasting service and remained the only one for a long time, sending on 
medium wave and receivable anywhere in Germany. 
Dussel (1999) p. 107 
 
Wie groß bei den nationalsozialistischen Machthabern die Furcht vor der zersetzenden 
Wirkung ausländischer Rundfunkpropaganda war und wie wenig sie auf die Durchsetzungs- 
und Überzeugungskraft ihrer eigenen Gesetze vertrauten, zeigt die Tatsache, daß sie den 
Empfang ausländischer Sendungen auch technisch zu verhindern suchten. Schon die 
Entwicklung und die Produktion des Volksempfängers VE 301 186 und des Deutschen 
Kleinempfängers in den Jahren 1933 bzw. 1935 standen unter dieser Maßgabe. Bei diesen 
beiden Billiggeräten fehlte ein Empfangsteil für Kurzwellen, auf denen rund 95 Prozent der 
ausländischen Sendungen ausgestrahlt wurden. 
Weidenhaupt (2001) p.56 
 
How much the national socialist authorities feared the subvertive power of foreign 
broadcasting propaganda and how little trust they had in their own laws can be seen by their 
attempts to physically prevent the radio reception of foreign programs. Even the development 
and production of the Volksempfänger VE 301 186 and the Kleinempfänger in the years 1933 
and 1935 was structured accordingly. Both low-priced devices were lacking a receiver 
capable to receive short-waves on which around 95 percent of the foreign programs were 
transmitted.  
Weidenhaupt (2001) p.56      
 
Großbritannien reagierte auf die deutschen Abschottungsbemühungen mit verschiedenen 
Gegenmaßnahmen. Hatte man bei Ausbruch des Krieges den Kurzwellenbereich wegen seiner 
hohen Reichweite und seines geringeren atmosphärischen Schwundes favorisiert und dem 
Europa-Dienst der BBC lediglich einen einzigen Mittelwellensender zugestanden, so 
installierte man im Verlauf des Krieges angesichts der fehlenden Kurzwellenteile in einem 
Großteil der deutschen Radios vermehrt, Mittel- und Langwellensendeanlagen. 
Weidenhaupt (2001) p.56 
 
Great Britain reacted to the German isolation attempts with various countermeasures. At the 
beginning of the war short-waves were favored because of the high range and low 
atmospheric losses and the BBC was equipped with only one medium wave transmitter. But 
because most German radios were lacking short-wave receivers it was decided to install 
additional medium-wave and long-wave transmitters during the ongoing war.    
Weidenhaupt (2001) p.56  
  
lm Jahr 1943 verfügte der Europa-Dienst bereits neben 24 Kurzwellensendern über drei 
Mittelwellen- und einen Langwellensender. Die über Mittelwellen ausgestrahlten 
deutschsprachigen Sendungen der BBC waren lange Zeit die einzigen Sendungen, die von den 
leistungsschwachen Geräten in den deutschen Haushalten überhaupt empfangen werden 
konnten. 
Weidenhaupt (2001) p.56-57 
 
In 1943 the Europa-Dienst already had three medium-wave and one long-wave transmitters 
besides its 24 short-wave transmitters. The medium-wave transmitted German broadcasts of 
the BBC were for a long time the only programs that could be received by German 
households at all.  
Weidenhaupt (2001) p.56-57   
 
Den Höhepunkt bildete das Jahr 1943 mit wöchentlich mehr als 34 Stunden, die vor allem 
über Kurzwelle, abends und nachts aber auch mit Hilfe starker Mittel- und Langwellensender 
nach Deutschland gesendet wurden. Die Verwendung von größeren Wellenlängen sollte auch 
den vielen Deutschen, die über kein zum Kurzwellenempfang geeignetes Radiogerät 
verfügten, das Hören des Deutschen Dienstes ermöglichen. 
Kaufmann (2013) p.42 
 
The high point was reached in 1943 when over 34 hours of weekly broadcast was transmitted 
to Germany mainly via short-wave and at night via strong medium-wave and long-wave 
transmitters. Longer wavelengths were intended to facilitate listening to the German Service 
by the many Germans who didn’t possess a radio that was capable to receive short-waves.  
Kaufmann (2013) p.42   
 
Die individuelle Einstellmöglichkeit der Rundfunkempfänger sollte dem Zwangsempfang 
weichen. […] Zusätzlich wurde die Möglichkeit erörtert, neue Geräte grundsätzlich ohne 
Kurzwellenteil zu produzieren und in bereits vorhandenen die Kurzwellenteile stillzulegen 
oder auszubauen. 
Klinger (1983) p.227 
 
The individual setting possibility had to move for compulsory reception. Furthermore it was 
discussed to always produce the new devices without a short-wave receiver and to shut down 
or remove the short-wave receivers of the already existing radios.  
Klinger (1983) p.227 
 
Rund 95 Prozent dieser Programme und Sender wurden über Kurzwelle ausgestrahlt. Nun 
verfügte aber der "Deutsche Volksempfänger" vom Typ VE 301 GW, das in Deutschland am 
weitesten verbreitete Empfangsgerat, nur über einen Mittel- und Langwellenteil. 
Pütter (1978) p.127 
 
About 95 percent of the programs and channels were transmitted via short-waves. But the 
“Deutsche Volksempfänger” VE 301 GW which was the most widespread receiver in 
Germany did only have a medium-wave and long-wave device.   
Pütter (1978) p.127 
 
Da die Mehrzahl der Auslandssender ihre Programme über Kurzwellenfrequenzen ausstrahlte, 
für die das am meisten verbreitete Rundfunkgerät, der Volksempfänger, gar keinen 
Empfangsteil besaß, war der potentielle Hörerkreis von vornherein eingeschränkt.  
Pütter (1986) p.11 
 
Because most of the foreign channels transmitted their programs via short-waves for which 
the most widespread radios didn’t have a suitable receiving device the potential audience was 
limited from the start. 
Pütter (1986) p.11    
 
Die deutschsprachigen Sendungen der BBC waren die ersten und lange Zeit über auch die 
einzigen Sendungen für das Reich, die über Mittelwelle ausgestrahlt wurden und 
leistungsstark genug waren, um den berühmten "Mann auf der Straße" überhaupt zu 
erreichen. 
Pütter (1978) p.127 
 
The German broadcast of the BBC was the first and for a long time the only program for the 
Reich which could be transmitted via medium-wave and which was strong enough to reach 
the famous “man in the street” in the first place.   
Pütter (1978) p.127 
  
Short-wave receivers were not very popular already before the Nazis came to power: 
Die Fabrikation von Kurzwellengeräten, die z. B. in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika für 
den Inlandsmarkt und den Export (namentlich nach tropischen Gebieten) eine größere Rolle 
spielt, scheint in Deutschland nicht rentabel zu sein; denn ausgesprochene 
Kurzwellenempfänger wurden in der vergangenen Saison, von wenigen Ausnahmen 
abgesehen, nicht hergestellt.  
Institut für Konjunkturforschung (1933) p.17-18 
 
The production of short-wave devices which for example was very important for the United 
States of America in respect to its domestic market and export (namely to tropical regions) 
seems to be uneconomical in Germany; that is because real short-wave receivers were—apart 
from a few exceptions—not produced in the last season.  
Institut für Konjunkturforschung (1933) p.17-18 
 
Ohne Zusatzgeräte konnten mit dem Volksempfänger nur nahe gelegene deutsche Sender 
empfangen werden, das Hören ausländischer Rundfunkprogramme, die über Kurzwelle 
gesendet wurden, war nicht möglich.  
Benz (2008) p.50-51 
 
Without additional devices the Volksempfänger was only able to receive nearby German 
channels, the listening to foreign radio channels which were transmitted via short-waves was 
not possible.  
Benz (2008) p.50-51  
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APPENDIX G: DETAILED DATA SOURCES 
High treason court cases: 
1943-1945: Widerstand als "Hochverrat" 1933 - 1945 / hrsg. vom Institut für Zeitgeschichte, 
München 
Data on BBC transmitters: 
Martin Watkins' AMFREQS Spreadsheet: http://www.mds975.co.uk/Content/AMFREQS.zip 
(retrieved on 7. Nov 2016) 
Data on listeners in Germany: 
1 April 1940: Schaefer, Horst, Rundfunk Archiv. Rundfunk und Fernsehen in Wissenschaft 
und Praxis, Jan. 1941, vol 1, R. v. Decker’s Verlag, p.71-77. („Die Verbreitung des 
Rundfunks im Deutschen Reich in den kleineren Verwaltungsbezirken am 1. April 1940“) 
1 April 1939: Schaefer, Horst, Rundfunk Archiv. Rundfunk und Fernsehen in Wissenschaft 
und Praxis, Jan. 1940, vol. 13, R. v. Decker’s Verlag, p.71-77. („Die Verbreitung des 
Rundfunks im Deutschen Reich in den kleineren Verwaltungsbezirken am 1. April 1939“) 
Data on bombing: 
Davis¸ Richard G., Bombing the European Axis Powers: : A Historical Digest Of The 
Combined Bomber Offensive, 1939-1945 Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala : Air University 
Press. 2006 (with CD-ROM) 
Other district level data: 
Data compiled by Adena et al. (2015), see data description in the original article 
Data on transmitters in Germany including jamming transmitters: 
1944: Möller, Bernd-Andreas (2009) Handbuch der Funksende- und empfangsstellen der 
Deutschen Reichspost. Funk-Verlag Hein. 
Data on weather:  
We received weather station data on daily cloud density, rain and wind strength in 1943-1945 
from Kachelmann GmbH, kachelmannwetter.com. There were 146 weather stations but not 
all are active thorough the complete period under study. We use a spherical variogram for the 
interpolation (for implementation see: https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/gstat/) and a 
grid with 50.000 cells. Cloud density, rain and wind strength are interpolated for a set of 
places that consists of all cities over 20,000 plus other places being bombed plus places of 
resistance (place of living or resistance act). For small places localized next to each other (or 
next to a larger city), a rule of thumb of 5 km (straight line) is used to merge them together (or 
to a larger city). For example Rheinhausen, Rheinhausen/Krupps, Duisburg/Rheinhausen, 
Friemersheim, Ruhrort, Meiderich are all merged with Duisburg. Places outside of German 
empire boundaries 
(https://web.archive.org/web/20170709100924/http://censusmosaic.org/data/historical-gis-
files based on: MPIDR [Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research] and CGG [Chair for 
Geodesy and Geoinformatics, University of Rostock] 2011: MPIDR Population History GIS 
Collection (partly based on Hubatsch and Klein 1975 ff.)—Rostock; Hubatsch, W. and T. 
Klein (eds.) 1975 ff.: Grundriß der deutschen Verwaltungsgeschichte—Marburg.) are dropped 
(especially relevant for the resistance sample). Also places outside of 120 km around the 
weather stations are dropped for reasons of reliability of the interpolation. 
Berlin damage maps: 
“Blue Book” (March 1945) from Imperial War Museum. Note that the data is pre-Red Army 
invasion and destruction thus reflects bombing damage. This is in contrast with the map from 
the Agency for Cartography of Berlin in 1945 (“Gebäudeschäden im Gebiet der Stadt Berlin, 
Stand 1945, Topographische Karte 1:25000,” Herausgeber: Hauptamt für Vermessung der 
Stadt Berlin). 
Moral Division Survey: 
Data is from the USSBS. The individual returns were located in the National Archives in 




APPENDIX H:  EFFECTIVE COMBAT RANGE 
 
Actual combat conditions in WW II differed significantly from those for which the B-17 had 
been designed, the USAAF had expected, and manufacturers had incorporated in their design 
(Hastings 2013). We use the declassified design specification of the B-17 (figure F.1), which 
gives the plane’s range and combat radius as a function of bomb load, height flown, and speed 
(Boeing 1949). Because of the strength of German fighter attacks and flack, the entire journey 
from crossing the Dutch coast to the German target would normally be flown at altitude, 
while the manufacturer had only expected a climb 30 minutes prior to the bomb run. Also, 
combat flying was markedly faster than expected. Operational data from the USAAF shows 
that B-17s flew both high and fast. They also required significant time to form up: bomber 
formations were often so large that the first planes had reached their targets inside in Germany 
when the last planes were just crossing the Dutch coast. Accounting for the effect of these 
factors on combat radius is not an exact science.  
 
We use the manufacturer’s model calculations for combat radius with the following 
assumptions: Boeing’s model gives ranges by bomb load and airspeed. We use this table but 
modify it in two ways. The model calculations in the manufacturer’s spec sheet give an 
average range on a basic mission of 873 nautical miles, or 1,617 km (line “COMBAT 
RANGE OR RADIUS”, column I). With high altitude, this drops to 788 nm (column V), and 
with high speed, to 595 nm (IV). Since both were typically used simultaneously, we calculate 
effective range as the product of range ratios, 0.9 and 0.68, respectively. This implies 
0.62*873 nm = 537, or a combat radius of 995 km. From this we deduct 10 km due to the 
need to form up over England, giving an effective maximum combat range of 985 km.  
 
This adjustment is derived from following example: Bomber airfields of the 8th USAAF had 
been developed all over East Anglia. The USAAF 8th manual on tactical development (figure 
F.2) gives the example of an attack on Berlin in March 1945. Bombers of the First Air 
Division, 379 Bombardment Group based in Kimbolton, Cambridgeshire near St. Neots, UK 
(just South-West of Huntingdon, on the map of figure A.1), first flew to Watton, Norfolk, 
then from Watton to Cromer, where they formed up for the attack on Berlin. Instead of the 
straight line distance to Berlin of 928 km, they had to fly 952 km on the way out, adding 24 
km to the distance travelled on the leg “out”. Since the forming up only happened on the way 
towards the target, but not on the return flight, the extra flying time during assembly translates 
into a reduction of 12 km of effective combat radius. Since St. Neots is somewhat further 
West than the majority of East Anglia airfields (figure F.3), we settle on an average 
adjustment of 10km.1 
 
 
Figure H.1: B-17 Performance Specifications and Range Information 
Source: Boeing (1949) 
 
                                                
1 Some units of the First Air Division formed up as far away as Oxford; other diverted North over the Wash to 
avoid the risk of collision when assembling bomber streams.  
 
 
Figure H.2: Wing and division assembly, 8th USAAF 
Source: USAAF (1945).  
 
 
Figure H.3: Wing and division assembly, 8th USAAF 
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